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Ihe relationship cf Saudi Arabia and the United States
is examined, particularly in the framework of Gulf Security.
A brief analysis is conducted of internal authority within
Saudi Arabia followed by a look at security problems in the
Gulf region as seen from the Saudi perspective. Hew the
Saudis perceive the role cf the United States in Gulf
Security is then studied, with an emphasis on the cultural
clash and the problems which are wont to arise. With an
assumption that Saudi-U.S. relations are likely to continue
in the foreseeable future, and that such relations are in
the test irterests cf the United States, a conclusicn is
reached which offers several suggestions for strengthening
these ties, reassuring the Saudis of American resolve, and
encouraging the maintenance of stability in the Gulf recicn.
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I- IHTB0D0C1ICS AN£ HISTORICAL BACKGROUN D
Saudi Arabia sees in the disunity of the Middle Eastern
Aran states a threat to its own stability. The primary
sources cf the unrest in the region are clearly perceived to
he Israel ard Iran. Ihe intrusion of Israel into the region
brings alout Arat unrest. This unrest and general destati-
lizaticn allows the Soviet Union to enter into the region.
The fundamentalist Shi'ites cf Iran and other f ua damentalist
Sunni groups threater tc outflanX the traditionally conser-
vative Wahhabis cf Saudi Arabia on the religious right. As
the Saudi royal family attempts to modernize its country, it
is caught in the dilemma of satisfying those who would move
faster while net alienating the devout Muslim general
population.
At the same time, as a result of' the general unrest,
Saudi Arabia has beer able to come to the forefront cf lead-
ership ir the Middle East. The country's wealth coupled
with its religious prestige has given the Saudis a rele
cever before held.
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Tfce icle that the Saudis envision for the United States
in this confusing maze of social, political, religious and
econcnic aiimosities is unclear. The Saudis want to main-
tain a good relationship with the United States, as American
power is a trump card ensuring against Iraqi, Iranian, and
possible Scviet and Israeli aggression. On the otter hard,
too close a relationship with a country identified as the
full supporter of Israel will result in being alienated fiom
the rest cf the Arab horld. The experience of Egypt after
Camp Cavid has net been lost on the Saudis.
A complaint which is often made by Saudi diplomats wten
dealing fcith Americans is abcut a lack of understanding.
Americans dc not understand Arab culture, Arab ethics, or
the Arab pcint of view in Gulf security. Fortunately, there
has teen seme reccgrition of this shortcoming within the
United States government and particularly the military. In
a recent article, lieutenant General Eobert C. Kingston,
Commander in Chief cf the C.S. Central Command, expressed
his cwi concerns over this prctlem.
The differences in culture pose a challenge equally as
great as the harsh environment. There is a significant
difference between western perceptions and the way busi-
ness is conducted in the region. An understanding of
cultural sensitivities is vital to successfully
discharging our responsibilities- [fief. 1]
1 1
General Kingston joints out a serious deficiency in U.S.
political-iilitary relations in tne Middle East. Americans
are placed in a situation where they are supposed tc make
vital decisions regarding U.S. security in the Middle last.
Cften, these same individuals, while well meaning, have a
limited tac*ground ir the Middle Eastern point of view. As
General Kingston states, unless there is "an understanding
cf cultural sensitivities," it will be difficult, if not
impossihle, to carry cut vital security arrangements.
Ihis thesis will examine the relationship between Saudi
Arabia ard the United States. An emphasis will re placed
upon an understanding of how the Saudis view their cwn
security problems as well as security in the Gulf regicn in
general. Ihis will involve an analysis of domestic Saudi
political problems as well as regional difficulties anc the
restraints these impcse on Saudi policy.
That there is a significant difference in the culture of
Saudi Aratia and that of the United States, is guite
obvious. An examination will be conducted of these differ-
ences and the resultant clash of cultures which cften
concludes in misunderstanding- How the governments of the
United States and Saudi Aratia perceive each other, their
interests, goals, and motives is critical to a mutual
•ability tc work toward an understanding.
All cf these will be brought together into some observa-
tions and conclusions as well as suggestions being offered
as tc hew future relations might be improved and cemented.
If an attempt is not cade by Americans at understanding the
Saudi point of view, mistakes in foreign and military policy
will be far more likely to occur.
A. ACTHCRI1Y IN SAOII ARABIA
How often have the few conquered the many through the
will cf God!
The Quran, II, 24S.
When Abdul Aziz and his hand of forty men seized Riyadh
from the Rashid family on 1 6 January 1902, the future cf the
Arabian Peninsula was taken into the hands of the Al Sa*ud
family. Under the banners cf a conservative, fundamentalist
Eahhari version of Islam, 1 the Al Sa'ud and allied trires
l 1he Sahhabis have always disliked the name customarily
giver tc them. Itey have preferred to be known as
"Unitarians" (Muwahidun) , for to call themselves Wahhabi
would be tc fall irtc one cf the great errors they have
always condemned, the glorification of men, saints, or
13
managed to recreate the Saudi empire first established on
the peninsula in the earlj 19th century. Today/ Saudi
Arabia, under the rule of Abdul Aziz's eleventh son, Eatd,
continues much of the same Kahhabi fundamentalist drive,
mixed with a careful modern izaticn program.
Luring the 1950's and 1960's, Saudi Arabia was consid-
ered ty the rest of the Arab world to be too conservative to
be a leader in the mcdern age. With the defeat of the Arabs
and the loss of prestige to Nasser and the Egyptian forces
after tie Six Cay fcar of June 1967, the conservative,
devoutly Muslim, cil rich Saudis suddenly became mere
appealing and influential throughout the Arab, and to seme
extent, tie entire Islamic world. At the center of
authority in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is the family which
gives its name to most of the Arabian Peninsula.
lie Al Sa' ud (the House of Sa'ud), can trace its origins
to the Anazah tribe, when a father and son left the desert
in 1446 and settled at the oasis of Dar'iyah, a small tewn a
prophets so as to dilute contemplation and worship cf the
one supreme God (Allah). Eut, 'Unitarian* has, of course,
Christian connotations to outsiders, while other suggested
titles like "the religion of Unity" (Din al Tawhid) have
failed to stick. So, like it or not, the Wahhabis have,
along with the Quakers and the Methodists, remained known by
the name first assigned to them by their detractors.
£Bef. 2]
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few miles ncrth of fiiyadh. It was not until around 1744,
however, when Muhammad ibn Sa'ud allied himself with a forty
year eld wandering teacher of the Quran, that the power of
the Sa'ud family began to he felt throughout the Arahian
Peninsula.
1 . fcahhabism
Euhammad ibn Abdul Wahhar was born in 1703 aid scent
his life studying the word cf Allah as revealed in the
Quran. He traveled throughout the Nejd ministering tc the
bedouin and organizing purges of what he called idclatrcus
objects. He was soon elevated to the position of a gadi, a
judge, and used his position to have many holy shrines and
tombs destroyed to which pilgrimages were being made.
Ibn Abdul Wahhab was strict in his teachings, so
much so that he socr he found the tribesmen refusing to
accent him as their gadi. 2 Muhammad ibn Sa'ud, the ruler of
the desert village of Dar'iyah, was impressed with iahhar's
2 The story is told that Wahhab had come across a woman
guilty cf adultery. He organized and had carried cut the
traditicial punishment prescribed in the Shariah, having her
stoned tc death. Under the bedouin Arab tradition, however,
the natter of preserving family honor is strictly the
purview cf the woman's brothers. Many of Nahhab's followers
took offense to his strictness and removed their support for
his teachings. [Ref. 3]
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steachings/ however, and bid him "welcome to a country that
is better than your can ccuntry." [fief. 4] The Isacher
reformed tie practice of Islam among the Al Sa'ud and
instilled in them a new fervor of Muslim expansionism . If
the neighboring Muslins would net respond to gentle persua-
sion, then jihad would be declared, bringing on a "hcly war"
and a nore forceful cenversion was obtained.
Ey 1802, the Wahhabi Saudis had conquered Biyadh,
the ccast along the Persian Gulf, and finally the Hcly
Cities cf Mecca and Medina. The reputation of the invader
was fearful, as they had killed most of the male inhabitants
cf al-laif, a town near Mecca, when armed resistance was
offered. The Holy Cities cpened their gates and the
Kahharis destroyed the shrines and images, turning away
pilgrims as idolaters.
The fundamentalist teachings of Muhammad irn Abdul
fiahhat permeated the Al Sa'ud and the tribes which allied
themselves to the new Ararian power. The Al Sa'ud had
unified core area of the heartland under one rule since the
early days cf Islam.
1h€ capture cf Mecca and Medina did not please the
Cttcman Empire. Sultan Mahmud II in Constantinople crdered
his Vicercy in Egypt, Muhammad Ali, to regain control over
16
the Hcly Cities. Innediate action was not possible due to
the Napclecric Wars, then keeping tne Ottoman armies cccu-
fied, tut Ali's son, Ibrahim Pasha, was finally sect in 1819
with a large Turkish-Egyptian army to teach the Sa'ud a
lesser. Alter a blccdy six month long campaign, the patri-
arch ci the Al Sa'ud, Abdullah ibn Muhammad, surrendered,
hoping tc spare any further bloodshed. Abdullah was taken
in chains tc Constantinople where he was eventually killed,
and the tewn of Car'ijah was leveled.
After the Ottcman Turks left, the Al Sa'ud made no
attempt to rebuild Ear'iyah, tut moved further scuth alcng
the «adi Harifah to Eiyadh. There, a second Saudi empire
was built, only to be lost in 1891 to the Rashid, anctrer
desert family. The ieligicus fervor and simplistic, bare
tones version of Islam ingrained during the first Saudi
empire fueled Abdul Aziz and his followers in regaining
power frcm the Rastids in 1902, eventually establishing
present day Saudi Aratia.
2- Jhe Al-Sa' ud
Any discussion of Saudi Arabia must mention the
founder cf the ccuntiy, Abdul Aziz ibn Abdul Rahman, cften
referred to by westerners as "Ibn Sa'ud." from 1902 until
17
his death in 1953, Abdul Aziz was the center cf authority in
Saudi Arabia. As in the Arab tribal traditicc, he
surrounded himself with those he could trust most, usually
his trcthers, close cousins, and his sons'. The lice cf
Abdul Aziz is a long cne, as he sired at least 42 sens (45
by seme accounts) by fifteen or twenty different wives, as
well as numerous danchters. The relationship between the
various trcthers and half-brothers is key to understanding
the internal family alliances, squabbles and political
power - 3
Curing the mid 1930's, it had been decided that in
order to solidify fanily strength, the head of the govern-
ment would be a partnership between the King and the Crown
Erince, the next in line. It had also teen agreed upon that
the lire cf successicn would net pass from father to sen,
tut frcm cne son of Abdul Aziz to the next, in crder of
3 Shile Saudi men will dis&iss a Westerner's attempt to
differentiate between brothers of the same and different
mothers, claiming to all be true brothers of the same
father, they are intimately aware of the relationships. Icr
example, probably the most powerful grouping of brothers is
the so-called Sudeiri Seven, the eldest of whom is King
fahd, and includes aacng others, Prince Sultan, the Eefense
Sinister, Erince Naif, the Interior Minister, and Prince
Ahmad, the Deputy Interior Minister. See Appendix C for a
listing cf the sons cf Abdul Aziz.
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seniority of age. This would prevent one line of the family
from keeping the thrcie to the exclusion of the others.
When Abdul Kiiz ibn Ardul Ranman Al-Sa'ud died on 9
Novemter 1Si3, Sa 1 ud inn Abdul Aziz became King, and Piir.ce
faisal ire Abdul Aziz was named Crown Prince. The arrange-
irents had teen made in the 1930's when Abdul Aziz realized
that Sa'ud was not tie most dynamic of possible leaders for
his country. Faisal, on the other hand, had been making a
Dame for himself as Prince of the Hejaz, and was widely
regarded as the more capable of the two brothers. Faisal
was named Crown Prirce to add stability and wisdom to
Sard's reign.
Shortly after Sa'ud assumed the throne it became
apparent that he was not going to be an effective ruler.
While he was popular at first, particularly among the
tedouin, his obvious flouting of wealth and luxury ulti-
mately becaiie his undoing. Sa'ud had created a new Council
of Ministers, throwing out many of the ministers of his
father's regime and largely ignoring their recommendations.
He legan to gather around himself a group of advisers
consisting primarily of his own sons and, oddly, his chauf-
feur and chief mechanic, Eed irn Salim. Apparently, Sa'ud
could net accept the criticism of his brothers and ec set
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cut tc create his our dynasty as the ruling power elite in
Saudi Araria.
lie presence cf Faisal as the Crown Prince was a tie
to forestall any great problems for a short time, but strife
rroke cut anong the family. In 1960/ Talal, one of Sard's
younger trcthers, resigned as Minster of Finance and left
Saudi Arabia, gcing to Cairo. His brothers, Badr, and
Fawwa2 eventually joined him, along with his cousin Sa'ad
ibn Fahd, in a "Free Prince" movement. Abdul Mchsin ibn
Abdul A212, Talal' s older half brother, while remaining
behind ir Eiyadh, was obvicus in his support of Talal's
views as well. Using the name "Saudi Liberaticn Front,"
Talal ticadcast from Cairo for several years calling for a
constitutional democratic monarchy. 4
Ey late 1963, the division within the Al Sa'ud had
grown serious enough for the Senior Princes 5 to decide that
In 1S63, after it was apparent that Sa'ud was going to
re removed from power by the rcyal family, Talal began over-
tures tc return to Saudi Aratia. He and the other "Free
Princes" finally made amends and were accepted back intc the
family in 1964. This pcints out just how strcng the
al-Sa'ud are in recovering from dangerous splits in the
family.
5 The sons of Abdul Aziz are generally referred tc as the
"Senicr Princes" while his grandsons, the sons of the Senior
Princes, are known as "Junior Princes." This terminology is
beginning tc change as the Junior Princes advance in age and
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the time had come fcr Sa'ud tc abdicate the throne. lor a
time it has urged that he he declared the "Imam", the spir-
itual leader, while Faisal would be the chief execute: of
the gcverraent. Wher Sa'ud refused to be "kicked upstairs",
the ticthers went to the ulema, the religious leaders in the
community.
Muhammad ibn Atdul Aziz, the third eldest livirc sen
cf Atcul Aziz, finally solidified support among the family,
and the ulema was asked to issue a fetwa, a religious
ruling, which would in effect reduce Sa'ud to a figurehead,
with Faisal having the actual power. After a long series of
meetings, the Shaikhs cf the ulema issued the fetwa en 29
fiarch 1S£4.
May Gcd re praised and bless His faithful Follower:
In view cf the ctrrent conflicts between His Majesty
King Sa'ud and his brother, His Royal Highness Frirce
Faisal. . . .
In view cf the fact that these divergences have reccme
more sericus recently and that they have threatened to
cause discrder and chaos in the country, with disastrcus
results which enly Gcd Almighty could foresee....
governmental responsibility. Princes such as Sa'ud al
Faisal (age 43) and Eandar ibc Sultan (age 35) are rafidiy
apprcaching the time when they will need to be considered as
Senior Princes.
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And in view of the fact it is essential to find ways and
means cf permanent solving these unending divergencies
and disputes..
.
the undersigned have decided the
following in the general interest:
(1) His Majesty King Sa* ud will remain the Sovereign of
the country, with all the respect and reverence due tc
his position.
(2) His Ecyal Highness Prince faisal, Heir to the Throne
and Prime Minister, shall discharge all the internal and
external affairs of the state, both during the presence
and in the absence cf the King, and without referring tc
him. £Bef. 5]
King Sa'ud refused to accept the ruling of the ulema
and asked for a reconsideration. He claimed that it was not
in the desert tradition for a ruler to wear the badges of
office but not actually rule. 6 Sa'ud stated at one time, "I
am not Queen Elizabeth." [fief. 6] He discovered, however,
that he could net rule without the consent of the family.
The princes and the ulema did reconsider the fetwa, deciding
that abdication was the only answer. After a 29 Octoher
1964 meeting of a hundred or so princes of the Al Sa'ud and
several dozen religicus leaders, Muhammad ibn Atdul Aziz
went tc Sa'ud on 3 November and asked for the abdication.
Precedent had already teen set for this idea, however.
Abdul Bahmar had stepped aside in 1902 to allow his sen,
Abdul Aziz to be the ruler. He retained the title "Imam" as
the spiritual leader and eldest cf the family.
22
Sa'ud acreed that fane day and flew from Riyadh Airport
round foi Eeirut, Cairo, and finally to the place where he
was eventually tc die in exile, Atnens.
Kith the accession of Faisal to the throne, the
question of who would become the Crown Prince was raised.
Muhammad was the next in line, and was in a strong position,
having just taken the leading role in uniting the family
against £a'ud. His stature was more that of a warrior than
of a statesman, however, and the other brothers urged him to
renounce his claim tc the throne.
Abdul Aziz, during the more militant early days, had
referred tc Muhammad as "Abu Sharrain," or "the Father Of
Twin Fvils." It was the fierce, warlike Muhammad who had
directed the savage and de vastatingly effective machine gun
fire at the battle which slaughtered most of the Ikhwan in
lecemier 1929.
fcuhammad, realizing the feelings of his trcthers,
commented, "I'd never make a king. All those ministers and
secretaries telling me what tc do. I'm a simple man, and
they'd just make a monkey of me." [Ref. 7]. Muhammad
then joined with Faisal in convincing Khalid, the next
younger brother to accept the position. After some initial
reluctance, it was announced in tne Spring of 1S65 that
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Khalid, then age 53, would teccme the Crown Prince, next in
line tc te King.
lh€ family had survived the first major crisis of
authority since the death of Atdul Aziz. An unsatisfactory
ruler had teen peacefully removed from power and replaced by
a more competent individual. The line of succession had
teen maintained by convincing Muhammad to step aside,
allowing a more gualified ycunger brother to take his place.
Ihe pattern for later solutions to guestions of succession
cf authority had been set.
King Faisal was assassinated on 25 March 1975 ty his
26 year eld nephew, laisal itn Musa'id. The death of the
King was received with disbelief throughout Saudi Aratia and
the Middle last. The National Guard was called out tc fore-
stall a possible coup attempt, but the country remained
calm, young Faisal being alone in his actions.
when Muhammad ibn Abdul Aziz heard of the death of
King laisal, he hurried tc Riyadh from his desert camp.
Although he had renounced his own claim to the throne, as
eldest surviving son cf Abdul Aziz he would have a decisive
voice in the decisions of the family. He had already
decided that Khalid lust te sworn in as King as seen as
m
possible and that 54 year eld Fahd snould be the Crcwn
Prince. This meant that twe ether brothers, Nasir and
Sa'ad, would have tc he bypassed, but this did net tether
Muhamnad, nor did it apparently bother any of the ether
princes.
Muhammad arrived at the majlis of Khalid and immedi-
atly embraced him, proclaiming his loyalty. In front of
most cf the rest of the Al £a ' ud he then walked over to
Fahd, embraced him, and announced his loyalty to him as
Crown Prince. Ihis tcld the rest of the family where the
cower lay, and the Princes one by one proclaimed their cwn
loyalties. Within hcurs of the assassination, a document of
fealtj was signed by Muhammad, Nasir, and Sa'ad, in crder of
seniority cf age, followed by the rest of the male members
cf the Sa'ud family. The immediate solidifyirg cf the
family behind the new King was seen as the only way tc main-
tain a solid basis oi authority in the country. Any public
sign cf division would be dangerous for all the princes. 7
7 Fhalid was generally seen by the world as an interim
ruler, merely awaiting the time for Fahd to assume pewer.
Never a healthy man, Khalid handed much of the day tc cay
cperaticn cf the Kincdom over tc the Crown Prince. After
Khalid's death in June 1982, there was never any question
that Fahd wculd accede tc the throne.
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following Khalid's sudden death on 13 June 1982/
land was quickly proclaimed King, and his next ycuncer
brother, Atdullah, lamed Crown Prince. The pattern of the
family guickly closing ranks and naming royal successors,
taking care to came qualified individuals was maintained.
The rcyal family is acutely aware that a consensus amcng the




Ihe benefit cf such an informal selection prccess
ensures a leader who is attentive to the desires of at least
a porticn cf the Saudi society. With the troad range of
views represented amcng the family, it would he unlikely for
the King tc be able to move from a wise course of action
fcithout resistance. The system of selection is net urlike
the infernal majlis method cf choosing tribal sheikhs. As a
result, the system is understood by the population, and
although net a democracy in the Western sense, results in a
reascnarly democratic outcome.
8 The seJection of Abdullah as Crown Prince under lahd,
even though he was next in line, solved a potential division
within the family. Pahd, a progressive leader, was meeting
some resistance by the more traditional factions of Saudi
society. Atdullah, teing the commander of the bedouin tased
Naticral Guard, is seen as a more conservative leader.
Thus, the family has used its diverse views tc solidify
potential divisive factors in Saudi politics.
26
3 • Ik i. Technocra ts
Although the royal family, particularly a few cf the
senicr princes, hold the reins cf power in Saudi Araria very
tightly, there are a few technically trained commoners who
are influential in national policy. Of this grcup of men,
the lest known in the West is probably Ahmad Zaki Yamani,
since 19 6 5 the minister of Petroleum and Mineral resources.
Sheikh Yamani is a very well trained and technically profi-
cient mar, exceptionally knowledgeable in oil matters. As
his experience has spanned almost eignteen years, his cpin-
ions en the international energy situation are highly
respected. There appears to he some doubt, however, as to
whether he holds the same influence among the royal family
en mere critical matters of oil policy. 9
Rhile such governmental agencies as the Armed
Forces, the National Guard, and Interior are headed by
Princes cf the rcyal family, the heads of many of the impor-
tant tranches of the government are of the technically
9 Killiam Quandt £5ef- 8] pcints out that an examination
cf scie cf Yamani 1 s public statements will reveal that he is
"not a particularly gcod guide to Saudi oil tehavior." Eis
personal opinions on the use cf spare Saudi oil productive
capacity tc enforce CPEC price discipline, however, are
apparently in line with King Fahd's views.
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educated .bureaucracy. This group of men are all apparently
loyal to the throne and seemingly not the material cut of
which a coup wocld arise. They are guite nationalistic,
however, and do press for a broader sharing of fewer.
£Bef. 9]
Ihe nationalistic attitudes of the technocrats are
expressed fcy a strong insistarce that Saudi Arabia ret be
taken for granted by the rest of the world, most particu-
larly the United States and the West. Where the royal
family would perhaps be receptive to American influence,
these ner wculd be less deferential to outside preferences.
As long as foreign pclicy formulation is firmly in the hands
cf the senior Saudi princes, however, the role of the tech-
nical bureaucracy will be limited to that of an adviser with
limited input and voice in the ultimate decision.
4. The Olema
King Khalid Monday received the ulema, religious sheikhs
and tribal leaders, as is customary every Monday.
A rab New s, 8 January 1 9 £0
.
Shortly after Abdul Aziz captured Riyadh frcn the
Eashids in 1902, he married larfah, the daughter of Sheikh
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Abdullah, the gadi cf the tcwn and leader of the local
ulema. 10 By this marriage, Atdul Aziz assured himself the
support cf the religious establishment . The fact that he
made the move demonstrates the importance of an Arah ruler
having the ulema on his side in any dispute. Abdul Aziz was
skillful in his handling of the ulema. Once, when the reli-
gious leaders complained about the public celebrations being
conducted in commemoration of the conguest of the Hijaz, he
admitted his guilt.
"Oh, Lord, I have added to my sins," he declared
publicly, and there were no more non-religious celetraticcs.
£fief. 10*- When Abdul Aziz was committed to winning an
argument with the ulema, however, he usually did. An cften
related tale concerns Abdul Aziz and his efforts at finally
convincing a chief sheikh cf the Mecca ulema to accept the
radic as a "gift of Gcd" rather than an instrument of Satan.
In various versions involving the telephone and other modern
conveniences, the tale is recounted to show the wisdcm of
10Steikh Abdullah was a direct descendent of Muhammad
ibn Atdul Wabbab. After Wahhat's death, his family became
known as the Al al-Sheikh, (cf the family of the Sheikh.)
ihile the title 'sheikh' is used by the leaders of various
desert tribes, it is also used to signify an important reli-
gious man. The memhens of an ulema will normally he called
sheikhs. Sabbat, as the founder of the "Wahhabi" trand of
Islam, was known as "The Sheikh."
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Abdul A2iz in dealing with the religious elders and cringing
about a degree of moderniza tion. Essentially, he gave into
the desires of the ulema on relatively unimportant matters,
as with the non-religious celebrations, but forced his way
en mere critical itens.
3he ulema was to be called upon by the royal family
cften at times when the legitimacy of royal authority was
threatened. The fetwa concerning the abdication of King
Sa'ud has already been recounted. The Mecca Grand Mcsgue
incident posed an especially grave problem for King Khalid.
At about 4:3C on the mcrnxng of Tuesday, 20 November
1979, just two days short of the first day of the first
lonth of the Islamic year 1400/ Juhayman ibn Muhanmad ibn
Saif al Otaiba 11 suddenly began shouting for the worship-
pers/ estimated at nearly 50,000, to recognize his brcther
as the Mahdi. 12 Hithir minutes, several dozen of Juhaynan's
1 *As Juhayman's name indicates, he was of the Otaiba
tribe which was centered around the town of Ghot Ghct, near
Riyadh. Ctaiba were central members of the Ikhwan ncvement
cf 1 S 19- 1928. Ihe Saudi massacre of the Ikhwan in 192S was
not forgctten by mary, and much animosity was retained
through the years. While this was not the only reason
behind Cuhayman's attempt at a revolt, it cannot be
discounted entirely.
12Islaaic tradition refers to a Mahdi, a "right guided
one" whe will be revealed on earth as a Messiah to lead
fluslifls to a just and more hcly world. Tradition states
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followers produced lifles frcm their robes and quickly
secured tie courtyard of the Grand Mosque. Several hurdred
more sprang up frcm among the surprised worshippers around
the Qa'ha of Abraham. Policemen and others whc resisted
were shot dead.
Ey 7:00 c'clcck King Khalid, in Biyadh, had teen
informed, Prince Sultan's army and Prince Abdullah's
Naticral Guard were called cut. The seizing cf Islam's Hcly
cf Holies was, aside from the obvious shock of the incident
itself, a direct affront to the honor cf the Al Sa'ud, the
guardians cf the most holy place in Islam. There vas no
guestion that the mcsgue must be retaken, but a sericus
religious problem was posed to King Khalid. The Quran
strictly prohibits the desecration of the House of Gcd. No
living thing may be killed in a mosque. King Khalid could
not just crder the amy to stcrm the building. The tradi-
tional taboos against the taking of life were even mere
strongly enforced during Muharram, the first month of the
Islamic jear. There was a serious possibility that nary of
the ticcps would actually refuse to accept an order tc fire
that tie Matdi will ccme at the beginning of a new century.
Cne hundred Islamic vears pricr, in 1882, another Mahdi
proclaimed his presence in Sudan.
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a weapon in the mosgue, net wanting to risk committing a
sacrilege as great as that already committed cy Juhayaan and
his religious fanatics.
Khalid turned to the ulema, requesting a ruling on
the matter. After a short meeting, the sheikhs issued a
fetwa stating that under the circumstances, the Shariah did
allow the taking of life, even in such a holy place. Prince
£ultan was ordered tc move in with the army.
"This is cur shame, and we must eradicate it
ourselves," Prince Sultan is reported to have said. "This
is God's House and ycu are His soldiers!" The attack went
as planned, but it took nearly two weeks of desperate and
rloody fighting to capture all the followers of Juhayman and
his mahdi. [Ref . 11]
As important as the ulema is, it is clear that the
power they have is United. While the Saudi leadership will
often defer to the advice and support of the religious lead-
ership, there is little doutt that if the royal iamily
strongly desires appicval of a certain action, it will have
no difficulty in obtaining it. The Al Sa'ud continue to
work closely with the ulema, however, to .keep any potential
challenger to Saudi authority from using the legitimizing
effect of the ulema tc further its aims.
E. CIX AHE AHEBICAHS
lie Aaerican association with Saudi Aracia began in the
early years of this century. Charles B. Crane was sent to
the Middle East as part of the King-Crane Commission by
President kcodrow Wilson in 1919. As a result of this trif,
Crane became enamored with the Arabs and their way cf life,
respite some unfortunate incidents, including being shot at
and seeing a friend killed by a group of Ikhwan (See glos-
sary. Appendix A) rear the Kuwait border in 1928/ he was
enthusiastic in his efforts to help "its primitive and
hostile peoples." [Eef. 12]
Ir 1S30, eager to obtain a pair of Arabian horses for
breeding purposes, Charles Crane arranged a meeting in Cairo
with Eteikh Fawzan al Sabik. Sheikh Fawzan was known to
have a stable which contained some of the finest Arariars in
the world. He was also King Abdul Aziz's personal represen-
tative in Egypt, allowing his business to perform the duties
cf a consulate.
Sheikh Eawzan, taving done some research into Crane's
background, discovered that the American had neen vccal and
active in his support for Arab causes. The Sheikh warmly
welccaed him into his majlis. He then took his visiter to
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look ever his horses. ilhen Crane indicated which two
Arabians he wanted tc purchase, Sheikh Fawzan presented the
pair tc him as a gift.
Crane, in typical American tasnion, initially refused
the gift, hut was quickly informed that it was considered an
insult tc refuse a gift offered from an Arab. In return for
the gift, Crane then insisted that he he allowed to person-
ally pay for a geologist to travel to Arabia to explore the
area and discover what mineral wealth might be explcited for
the benefit of the Arabs. After a short delay, time to
contact fiyadh, permission was obtained from Abdul Aziz. 13
[Bef. 13:
The geologist ultimately chosen to conduct the survey
was Karl S. Twitchell, a man Crane had worked with befcre
in otter projects in the Arabian Peninsula. He spent the
winter cf 193 1 traveling across eastern Arabia. Little
evidence of oil was fcund, but he did discover tbat it was
13 Earry St. Johr Philby claims to have had a large
personal rele in the discovery of oil in Saudi Arabia. 3y
his cvs accounts, he tcld Abdul Aziz about Charles Crane and
later arranged fcr Crane to travel to Jeddah. Whatever the
role cf Philby, Charles Crane apparently was never aware of
it. Philby complained that "Mr Crane never so much as sent
me a post card of thanks fcr the part I had played."
ffief. 14*
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teing prospected on Bahrain. Twitchell went to Riyadh to
report tc Abdul Aziz.
"Ihere is little difference in the geology letween
Eahrair and the mainland. If there was oil in Bahrain you
would picfally have it in ycur country." £Ref. 15]
Standard Oil of Southern California (30CAL, ard later
CASOC), jrospecting for oil or Bahrain, had reached the same
conclusion as Iwitctell. When the company headquarters
learned that Twitchell had personally surveyed the grcurd, a
fact ttat had apparertly reer relayed to them by fhilty,
Twitchell was quickly contracted by S0CA1. The Americans
made their first bid for the Saudi oil concession.
Ehiliy, after seeing S0CA1 interested in the oil ccrces-
sion, cctified his friends in the British oil companies.
Quickly, Irag Petroleum Company (IPC) entered the ccctest to
bid acainst the Americans.
Ire fri tish-cwned IPC believed there was no oil in Saudi
Arabia, so they ' adopted a tactic of blocking the American
company -ust to keep them out cf the region. They had simi-
larly telieved that there was no oil on Bahrain, which had
allowed SOCAL to gain a foothold there. Philby, despite his
teing Eritish, was convinced that the Americans would give
Abdul A2iz the most ncney, as sell as apparently having seme
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eld sccres to settle with the British government, so he
supported SCCAL. 14
Rfcen the bidding began, the test that the IPC could come
up vith was $33,000. The Americans, however, offered
1165, COC. 15 Money speke louder than words, especially to the
leader of a country who was desperate for cash. The world-
wide degression of the 1 930s had severely cut into the
cumbers of Muslins aaking the annual pilgrimage (Hajj) to
the Hcly Cities. As money from the Hajj was the crly real
income Abdul Aziz had, his need to raise money from else-
where has critical.
Accordirg to an interview which Robert Lacey conducted
with tuhammad Alireza, Abdul Aziz was ultimately ccrvinced
to take the American offer by the British Minister
l4 According to Lacey, Ehilby later admitted that he had
received a secret 11000 a month retainer from Ilcyd
Hamilton, the leader of the SCCA1 delegation, to further the
American case. Philby, hy virtue of having converted to
Islam, was able to travel to Mecca with Abdul Aziz during
the freguent recesses from the negotiations, thereby keeping
the King's ear. Thus, he essentially played the part of a
"double agent" ensuring the Americans would get the
contract, but only at an exceptionally high frice.
[fief- 16]
15 Ihe airounts offered were actually in British Pounds
Sterling. The I EC offered 10,000 and the Americans offered
50,0C0- A pound sterling was worth approximately 23.30 at
that time.
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Plenipotentiary to Arabia, Sir Andrew Ryan. Still believing
there to be no oil ii Arabia, a position Abdul Aziz tended
to relieve, Ryan reportedly told the King to take the
American oifer as it *as "money for nothing." [Ref. 17]
Although it is uncertain as to the precise reasoning
hehind Ardul Aziz's decision, the American-Saudi relation-
ship began en 9 May 1933 with Abdul Aziz granting Standard
Cil of Southern California the concession to find oil.
Almost five years later, after seven dry holes in the Dammam
dome of eastern Arabia, a decision was made to deepen Well
No. 7. Cn 16 March 1938, after drilling more than a mile
deep, cil was discovered. Weil No. 7 began producing
between 2,000 and 3,C00 barrels per day £Ref. 18]. Ihe
$165, COC was not "money for nothing" after ail.
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II. TEE SAUDI SECURITY DILEMMA
A. ECEESTIC CONCERNS
The cil cringes money. But in many ways it is a turden
to i€. (Abdul A2iz to G. Clinton Pelham, British
Amtassadcr to Saudi Arabia, 1951-55.) [fief. 19]
The iapact of entering the technical age has had a great
effect en the traditional desert patriarchal system from
which modern Saudi Arabia has grown. Until quite recently
the ccuntry was essentially unchanged from when it v«as
founded in the first years of the century. The discovery of
cil in 1938 inexorarly brought Saudi Arabia into direct
contact fcith the West.
Ike influx of Western, primarily American oil ard busi-
ness personnel, alcrg with the tremendous wealth teing
amassed by Saudi citizens has caused a large ripple ir the
traditicral desert scciety. The growing use of modern
conveniences, both in the home and by businesses have
brought atcut several problems which mast be addressed by
the Sauci government. Religious objections tc Western
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influence, the growth cf an increasingly large studert popu-
lation, and the charging r cle of women are but a few cf the
side effects which have an impact in determining the
continued stability and authority of the Saudi royal family.
1 . Eco nom ic Impact
a. Oil
Saudi Araria produced, as of mid 1982, en the
crder of 10 million iarrels of oil each day. At the price
cf abcut $32 per barrel, a gross revenue of three hundred
twenty million dcllais per day was produced. With rrcduc-
tion costs only about 50 cents per barrel ($5 million per
day) a daily balance cf $315 million was left. Carried cut
ever a 3£5 cay year, it translated to an annual revenue from
cil alcne in excess cf $100 billion. Considering that cil
revenue as recently as 1970 was only $1.2 billion [Eef. 20],
the tremendcus increase of national income over such a shcrt
pericd cf time cannot help but have a significant impact on
the country.
By Novemter of 1983, however, oil prices had
fallen tc between $28 and $29 per barrel. Hith a marked
drop iE demand world fcide, production plummeted from a 10
39
million tpd high in 1981, to 5 million tpd by the end of
1982. The current production rate is about 4.2 million bpd.
Estimated earnings for the Saudi fiscal year ending Karch
1984, are crly about 365 billicn. [Bef. 21]
Utilizing the capital gained from oil produc-
tion, the Saudis have begun the development of industry.
Eealizinc that one day the oil must run dry, there is a
growing concern to create a backup income source. Ccming
with the development of industry is the realization that
Saudi Arabia has a serious shortage of not only technically
trained personnel, tut semi-skilled labor as well. Ihe
necessity to import labor to fill the reguirements has
further impact on sccial stability and creates a potential
threat to future political stability.
While oil had been discovered in the Gulf as
early as 1908, Saudi Arabian oil was not found until 16
Earch 1928. The California Arabian Standard Oil Company
(CASCC) , successful after seven drilling attempts in the
Lamman Ecme area in eastern Saudi Arabia, began producing an
excellent grade of crude at a rate of 2-3,000 barrels per
cay.
By 1944, production had increased to nearly
22,00C harrels per day, and by 1946, was up to about 165,000
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tpd. Annual cil revenues reached around $10 million
[Bef. 22], a tremendous sum for a country heavily ir debt
after nearly two decades of worldwide depression and war.
King Afcdul Aziz, for all his wisdom, could not readily grasp
what such a large amount of money actually meant. Acting
much as the traditional desert patriarch, he simply gave his
noney ai«ay, personal generosity being the only form of
rational development program with which he could readily
identify. 3y the time of his death, the only real devel-
opment of his country existing as a result of oil wealth was
a railroad from Ehahran to Biyadh, a jetty in Jeddah, a few
paved asthalt roads, and some water wells.
Abdul Aziz's inability to envision a tetter
utilization of the national resources was but a small
example of the initial impact cil had on Saudi Arabia. It
took until 1964 with the accession of Faisal to the thrcne
hefore the realization was made that possibilities for
develcpnent existed ether than those traditionally under-
stood .
At the present rate of oil production, between 4
and 5 nillicn bpd, Saudi Aratia has discovered itself for
the first time since the 1960's with a budget deficit,
U1
probatly en the order or $10 million- During the period of
huge strilusses, there was much pressure from within the
bureaucracy to reduce production, keeping the oil supplies
from being depleted as quickly, and controlling the economy
cf the country. 16 Cil revenue is likely to continue to
decline, with some market observers having predicted the
price cf cil falling to $23 per barrel by mid 1 S84
£Bef, 243.
Saudi Araria and the other Gulf states are fully
aware that should the world oil market decline or the cil
fields cease producing, severe economic consequences would
he in store. As a result, a sizable percentage cf the
excess cil inccme was spent on creating an alternate
industry. In the late 1970's work began on building two
large industrial complexes, one in the east, Jubail cr the
Arabian Gulf, the other, Yanbu, on the 2ed Sea. The 1580-85
third five year plan, an ambitious project budgeted at $250
l6 Shaw and Long [Eef. 23] have a revealing discussion of
the limitations of Saudi oil production. According tc the
authors, 10 million hpd is at cr near Saudi Arabia's maximum
continuous daily oil production. While it may be possible
to increase to as muct as 1 1 million bpd, this could net be
maintained for mere than a few days witnout serious risk of
major eguipment breakdowns which would result in long term
reductions in output.
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tillicn, has net been meeting with great success. Most of
the developments are seriously behind schedule and nc lew
projects scheduled tc begin ir 1984.
The recent recession in the oil market has had
some impact on how Saudi Arabia is handling its foreign
contracts. Payments which used to be made quickly are cow
being delayed frcm 3C to 60 days. Instead of paying a 20%
advance to construction firms, only 10% is now offered. The
"heyday" of the 1970 's has reached an end with many business
and finarcial analysts predicting a slower and more deliber-
ately paced program ir the future, [fief. 25]
b . Ma n p cw e r
There are few incentives for young Saudis to
learn a technical skill, tc become trained
industrial wcrkers, to acquire acadenic
knowledge. With the exception of a few top
people in the ministries of governmert whe
are as able and hardworking as their count-
erparts anywhere in the world, one rinds
comparatively few Saudis who are using their
talents to develop tneir country. (William
B- Quardt) [Bef. 26 J
Quandt's cbservations come in the context that
wealth in Saudi Arabia does net come from hard work, tut
rather by "wheeling and dealing." Thus political and family
H2
connections are far core important than technical skills.
This has teen echoed by others studying the manpower dilemma
in Saudi Arabia. 17 Ite influx of technical industries ir.to
the country has presented the Saudis with a serious shortage
cf skilled and semi-skilled manpower. In 1980, it was esti-
mated that 80 percent of the total population and 60 percent
cf the urban populaticn was illiterate. To meet this short-
fall cf workers, much of the manpower pool must be imported.
This has in turn created a second problem. Of the approxi-
mately 1.8 million workers in Saudi Arabia, only 57 percent
are Saudi citizens. In many of the critical labor sectors,
non-Saudis make up a majority cf the workers.
In recent years, a strong emphasis has teen
placed ci young Saudis getting a substantial college level
technical education. With higher level educational institu-
tions guite limited en the Arabian peninsula, most students
must travel abroad. Most are sent to the United States,
although scne do go tc Eurcpe, particularly Great Eritain.
Ey 1S60, as many as 1500 to 3C00 students were returning to
17Shaw and long £Eef. 27] have an excellent discussion
cf the reasons behind the lack of a Western noticn cf a
"work ethic." The Islamic and traditional causes behind
these prcllems are a major obstacle to progress and modern-
izaticr in Saudi Aratia-
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Saudi Arabia each year having completed baccalaureate aid
higher level graduate degrees.
The influx of foreign nationals to fill the
labor market demands has led to some concern over the
possible ramifications on future political unrest. Should
the ncn-Saudi portion of the wcrk force get to the point of
agitating fcr better conditions, higher pay and more voice
in later related decisions concerns governmental authori-
ties. 3his unrest, mixed with the possibility of a vocal
student population, the threat of an Iranian backed Shi'a
Euslia movement, and the ever present possibility cf outside
agitaticr from Iran, poses a serious challenge tc the
continuation of a traditional monarchy in Saudi Arabia.
2 . S ocial I mp>ac t of Change
As recently as 1S48, Saudi Arabia was little
different than it was in the 18th century. Since that tine,
drastic changes have impacted on the society. Such rapid
movement, essentially to centuries of change in less tnan
forty years, cannot help but effect the various elements in
the Saudi Arabian social order.
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a. The Hoyal Family
Starting cut as a relatively small group cf sens
gathered about King Abdul Aziz, the royal family row
consists of at least 4,000 and possibly 6,000 male meairers.
A family of this size is not as easy to organize as were a
few dczei ir the 192C's and 1950 , s. Also, at least thecret-
icly, all cf the several thousand princes of the Al-Sa'ud
are ir tie line cf succession to the throne.
The eldest princes of the House of Sa'ud, the
sons cf Abdul Aziz, are esseDtially home educated individ-
uals, net having had the financial ability, nor apparently
the desire to be educated atrcad. The younger princes,
however, having grown up in a. more affluent age, are fcr the
most part, well educated at colleges and universities ir the
Qnited States and Great Britain. Thus, a "generation gap"
has regur tc develop as the younger, better educated, and
often guite capable ycung men tegin to push fcr more visitle
and responsible positions in the governiieEt.
Eissatisf action with the methods of the older princes is
growing, although most are reticent to discuss the matter in
public-
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Since Abdul Aziz died in 1953, all of the Kings
have h€€i from among his sons. There is no doubt that Crcwn
trince Abdullah will take over upon Fahd's deatn, and little
doutt that Sultan will follow him. 18 Beyond that, however,
speculation is rampart, with no one in the royal family
talkirc afccut it. Eventually, the move from Abdul Aziz's
sons to his grandsons will have to be made. The struggle
between the senior aEd junicr princes will likely continue,
reaching a teak toward the end of this century. 19
18 While there is not much doubt that Sultan itn Abdul
Aziz will be named tc follow Abdullah, there are four ether
brothers (Eandar, Musa'id, Abdul Mohsin, and .lisha'al) aho
claim to be in line to succeed ahead of him. Sultar has
countered this by claiming that he was born earlier than the
generally agreed upon 1927. All of these arguments aside,
however. Sultan, beirg head cf the Armed forces, has built
up such a strong power base within the royal family that he
should have no difficulty in achieving a consensus to
succeed tc the throne. There is precedent for skitting over
individuals in favoi of a younger brother, Khalid being
Earned over Muhammad in 1965, and Fahd named over Nasir and
Sa»ad in 1S"/5.
1 'During an interview with William B. Quandt, he indi-
cated that cne or maybe two more of the present generation
cf Al-Sa'ud will be King, but by the end of the century a
decision will need tc be made as to which of the grandsons
should be Crown Prince. Likely candidates include Sa'ud ibn
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t. The Military
Saudi Arabia has had a relatively small and
apolitical armed force. Recognizing that the military is at
the same tine a security for the state and a danger, it has
teen modernized tut net enlarged. By keeping it small, and
infusing a large number cf princes into the mid-grade
officer ranks, the chances cf a coup rising from the rarks
is kept to a minimum.
There were two attempts at carrying out a ccup
against tie Al-Sa'ud in 196S. The first was discovered in
June cf that year by a government infiltrater who was able
to warn of the attempt only hours before it was to occur.
The ccuf was organized by a group of Royal Saudi Air Force
officers supported t\ some left wing teachers and AEAMCO
workers. Cnce exposed, the officers were quickly arrested.
Especially since the airing of the movie Death of a rrirc ess
in 1980, there have teen persistent reports of the leaders
teing thxewn out of flying airplanes and others imprisoned
without trial [Ref. 28]. 3y late 1969, about 200 members of
Paisal, son of King laisal, and Bandar ibn Sultan, the son
cf Defense Minister Sultan ibn Abdul Aziz.
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the organization , discovered to have the name Movement of
Aran Nationalists, had teen arrested.
The stories of the brutal handling of the insti-
gators of the coup are, not surprisingly, vigorously denied
ty the Al-Sa'ud. Recent investigations by the British jour-
nalist and author Bctert Lacey, however, would appear to
tear cut the position of the royal family. After a year of
exhaustive searches, lacey has found that every person
arrested in 1969 in relation tc the coup attempt, including
lussef al Taweel, ringleader of the conspiracy, was, as of
January 1S61, still alive. [fief. 29]
A second coup attempt, which was not as well
organized and which get nowhere near as close to fruiticn as
the first, was discovered in July 1969. This group, prina-
rily led ty a retired generals Ali Zein Abdine and Atdullah
Aysi as well as other senior officers, were supported by
several fanilies in the Hejaz who had traditionally teen in
eppositien to the al-Sa'ud. It appeared that mest cf the
supporters were under the influence of Ahmad Tawil, a close
friend ci Erince Fahd, and had in the past teen aligned with
Prince lalal. After seeing none of the reforms premised
them hy Faisal after the deposing of Sa'ud, they decided to
take natters into their own hands.
US
The oilitaiy forces in Saudi Arabia are divided
intc two tarts. The regular armed forces, consisting ci the
Army, Air fcrce, and Navy, are under the leadership cf the
Sinister of Defense, Prince Sultan. A second force, the
National Guard, under the control of Sultan's half brother,
Crown Prince Abdullah, was devised during the 1950's as a
sort cf talsce guard, and is a less technical, bedouin hased
force- There is, ir addition, a third para- mill tar}' fcrce,
a type cf Internal Security Force under Prince Naif, the
Intericr Minister.
The Saudi Army is small, almost too small to be
useful in defending the bcrders against anything rut the
smallest cf contenders. Tc keep it under control, a
competing National Guard has been created, as well as a
Katicnal Security force under the Minister of the Intericr.
The Army is stationed away frcn the capital city of Riyadh,
while the National Guard is lccated nearby. The National
Security forces are located in the large cities tc etsure
that reither the Army cr the National Guard are too strong.
It shculd he pointed cut that the Minster of Defense, Prince
Sultan, is a full blether to the Minister of the Intericr,
Prince Naif, (two of the so-called Sudeiri Seven brothers),
while the Commander cf the National Guard, Crown Erince
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Abdullah, is but a tali brcther. The struggle cf power
tetween Sultan and Abdullah upcn the death of King Fahd will
determine much about the strength of the Al-Sa'ud in the
near future.
The military, most noticeably within Sultan's
Eefense ministry, has created a group of modern educated
young officers. These men are well trained technically,
cany having been educated atroad. 20 Also, in order to seme
extent to co-opt any possibility of military personnel
becoming disaffected with the government, they receive
attractive material incentives. Enlisted men receive large
cash payments, particularly upon reenlis tment , and officers
receive lard and interest free loans for houses. 21 Host
officers reaching tie rank of colonel are financially
secure
.
2C In a discussion with Mr. Bichard Henninghausen, the
£IA desk officer for Saudi Arabia, he indicated that abcut
the upper third of the pilcts in the Saudi Air Force were
probatly good enough to be in the United States Air Fcrce.
This was confirmed in discussrens with U.S. Air Force offi-
cers laving experience in Saudi Arabia.
21 The leans can he used fcr both their cwn houses and
for perscnal inves tmerts.
51
The Naticial Guard, being bedouin based, is less
educated, and accordingly less technical. Currently
consisting cf abcut 25,000 trccps, it is organized into 17
regular and 26 irregular battalions (300-400 men each.) In
addition, as part of the modernization program, there are 4
mechanized battalions, probably organized into a mechanized
brigade headguar tered near Biyadh. The present intent is to
continue the upgrade of the force, with M-1 tanks being
discussed as recently as late 1983. This has largely died
down, however, and M-60A1 tanks are likely to be substi-
tuted. Mcst of the current mechanized inventory consists of
eld Eritish armoied cars.
As the ailitary effers guite high financial
inducements to enter and remain in the service, it night be
expected fcr the nature of the officer corps to change,
fchile having in the past been largely consisting cf urta-
nites, the rural t€douins seeking financial and social
upward mobility will most likely seek to join.
The only real possibility of discontent rising
from tte military is from ameng some mid grade officers, who
may feel that the onlj way for them to rise to the top is by
participating in a ccup. In spite of the 1969 R5AF coup
attempt, there appears to be little evidence of any such
threat existant at tie present time [Ref. 31 ]. 3ased on a




jjh.2 i.£ the Kiddle East, and jjho^s who in Saudi Ar at ia , it
would appear that since 196S there has been a strong effort
at putting an increasing number of Princes into the armed
forces. Rather than pushing them to nigh rank, almost all
are mid-grade officers. As of 1981, the highest rank
achieved by any royal family member in the military was it.
Colonel. Since that time some have achieved the rank of
Colonel, nest notable being Prince Bandar ibn Sultan, now
Ambassador to the United States. There are no royal family
members cf general rank.. Ey keeping the Princes in tne
mid-grades it would perhaps be easier for the the royal
family tc keep tabs cr the potential for a coup. All cf the
military coups of the 1950's and 196C's in the kiddie East
arose frcm the ranks of the aid-grade, western educated
officers. The Saudis are obviously aware of this and have
taken seme steps to katch fcr it.
Thus, it would seem that the Al-Sa'ud are very
aware that there is a real possibility that a coup could
arise frcm the ranks cf the military. As a result they have
taken numerous steps, most cf which are directly frcm the
c
-
history recks of the Middle East. The most noteworthy of
the steps taken to zinimize the possibility are sumcaiized
telow .
1. Keep the Army snail.
2. Create several competing Armies.
3. flace royal iamily members in the mid-grade and
second echelon positions.
4. Modernize quickly but id small guantities.
5. Eiiphasize recruiting from favorable population
groups.
6. Emphasize lovalty to the royal family as a reguisite
fcr promotion.
c. The Technocrats
In much the same way as with the royal family
and tie nilitary, tie bureaucracy has within it a group of
intelligent, well educated and technically competent indi-
viduals. For the most part intensely nationalistic,
.
trey
desire progress for their country, which means that seme of
the traditional desert societal patterns will necessarily be
altered.
Dealing with many senior princes who are net as
well educated and less technically proficient has developed
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a certain frustration among the technocrats,
lieconiiiencations fchicl they see as progressive and for the
good cf the country are often not followed by the royal
family fcr what nay le perceived as non-progressive reasons.
Thus sithin the technocrats lies the possibility of a future
challenge tc the royalists.
The potential challenge posed by the technocrats
lust net be overemphasized, however. The overall attitude
is of strong Saudi nationalisn, and barring some acticn en
the part of the royalty which is perceived as selling cut
Saudi autonomy, there is little or no possibility cf a
serious challenge arising frcm this quarter.
d. The Merchants
The merchants are probably faring abcut as well
as they night under ary type cf governmental system. Khile
there are certainly seme outward changes in the businessmen,
for example wearing business suits and carrying briefcases,
there is little substantial difference between the aerchant
cf tcday and his counterpart several centuries ago. As many
cf tie things which are important to the merchants have
remained unchanged, there is little possibility cf any
sericus challenge being posed. If evidence from ether Arao
c c
regiaes is examined, it is easy to present a case that the
Merchants would be doing themselves a disservice tc do
anything except suptcrt the continuance of the present
systeir. 2 2
e. The Studerts
The problems already discussed with the rcyal
family, the military and technocrats had therr origins in
the western education of the young people of Saudi Arabia.
Eeginring ir the 196C's, with the rise of large amounts of
cil revenue, thcusards of students were sent abrcad tc the
United States and Great Britain to study. Simultaneously ,.
four Saudi Universities were created. 23 There are also
Islamic Universities and Institutes in Riyadh, Mecca, and
Medina.
22 In Egypt, Syria and Irag, the traditional nerchant
class was disrupted ty the socialistic reforms and attempts
at sharing the wealth among the citizens. Although Saudi
Arabia is highly socialized, the merchants have been allowed
to operate much as they always have with essentially no
interference from the government. £Ref. 31]
23Riyadh University; King Abdul Aziz University, Jiddah;
King Eaisal University, Dhahran; and University of Petrcleum
and Minerals, Dhahran.
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The studeits are strong Saudi nationalists and
see progression as the way cf the future. It also appears
that htile their patriotism is strong, they have net teen
politicized. There is an understanding that wnile progres-
sive action must be taken, there is a danger of taking
change tec fast, disrupting the traditional, conservatively
rased religious structure or the Saudi society.
Because cf the lack of political activity ameng
the students, the likelihood cf a serious challenge tc the
Saudi regime rising fiom these guarters is remote. 24 As leng
as this remains the case, the student population will merely
continue tc feed the growing demands for technically
educated pecple by the government bureaucracy, the military,
and business [Ref- 3 2 ~-
f. The Bedouin
The term bedouin is used loosely and somewhat
reluctantly. The true bedouin, the semr-nomadic desert
dweller ierding his camels, goats, and sheep across the
24As an interesting sidelight, following the Eecemrer
1979 incident at the Grand Mcsgue in Mecca, some students
criticized the goverment, asking why the secret police were
not mere effective in discovering the planned takeover. In
most ccuntiies around the world, students and secret pclice
are archenenies.
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deserts cf the Arabian Peninsula, are almost gone. West of
the Saudi population live in the cities and villages. All,
however, have some ties hack to the desert, and societal
practices are .based heavily on that tradition.
With the bedouin, the Al-Sa'ud enjoy a certain
popularity. Crcwn fiince Abdullah is careful to cultivate
his identity with the desert common man. His National Guard
is almost exclusively drawn from this segment of the
population.
For the Al-Sa'ud, maintenance of relationships
with tie bedouin is closely tied to their feelings of legit-
imacy. Ihe legends around Abdul Aziz and the stories he
liked to tell were heavily laced with tales of the desert
and the bedouin. Evec considering the size of the country
and the rumier of people under his rule, the King cf Saudi
Arabia can still be seen holding majlis in public. Ihe
common man can still have an opportunity to present his case
directly to the King, thus maintaining a link to the tribal
custom cf tie sheikh having direct access to his people- In
many cf the bedouins' eyes, the King is but a tribal sheikh,
only en a larger scale. The maintenance of this feeling by
the royal family among the people will do much to keep
stability in Saudi Arabia [Eef- 33].
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c. The Olema
If the technocrats represent the most prccres-
sive and literal of the forces at work within Saudi Arabia,
the Ulema represents the most conservative. with a revival
cf the intense Wahhari spirit, the Olema is injecting an
ever strcnger voice ir the government, urging conservatism
and restraint. Ihe rise of Khomeini in Iran has allowed the
Ulema a greater influence on the royal family.
The influx of Westerners and Western influences
in Saudi Arabia las civen rise to an outcry from the arch-
conservatives in the religious leadership. Particularly
with the appointment of Prince Naif as Minster cf the
Interior and his brother Ahmad as assistant to the Minister,
the enforcement of law has teen brought closer to tradi-
tional Islamic practice and the views of the Uleiia.
[Ref. 34]
h. Women
The role cf women in Saudi Arabia is one aspect
cf sccial change uhich is having a major impact.
Traditionally, women are kept separated from men. Ihe heme
is strictly the doiain of the wife, with the husband
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nessentially being a \isitor. The woman's closest friends
are ether women, ill social contact between stxes ether
than in the market, is prohibited.
With the rise of non-Arab influences, however,
nore women are leaving the traditional societal restraints.
While, according to 1S80 statistics, women made up less tha
2 percent cf the Saudi work force, the number has been
growing rapidly. Strain between younger women moving into
areas not traditionally female, older women (their aethers)
not ready to accept the new ways, and men seeing them there
for the first time have created new problems for Saudi
society.
The prospects fcr Saudi women are good, although
there is little doubt that it will be slow. Most cf the
inroads that women have made into education and business are
reminiscent of the early efforts by blacks in the Unfed
States tc gain the sane privileges. At present, a separate
tut egual arrangement appears to satisfy most. flacy harks
maintain separate bracches fcr women, or women have created
their own institutions, where men may not enter. 25 Hew leng
2
-lher€ is a stcry about a male merchant who, having
accepted a check from a woman, found that his own back wculd
not henor it. lakinc the check to the woman's bank, he was
refused entrance. Cnly by inducing the guard to handle the
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these arrangements will continue to be adequate is hard to
deteraine. £Bef. 36 j
i. The Shi'ites
The Shi'ites, while about 275,000 in nuirter and
the largest single Saudi minority group, are still tut a
very snail percentage of the overall population cf over 4
jiillicn. Over half cf the Shi'ites live in the Qatif oasis,
north cf Lhahran, where they are 98 percent of the local
populaticn. Most of the remaining Shi'ites live 100 niles
to the scuth at the al-Hasa oasis, making up about half the
populaticn there.
Being located in the Eastern Province cf Saudi
Arabia, the Shi'ites are situated in the heart cf the cil
fields. As a result, much of the local work force on the
.SRAMCC projects are Shi'ite. These people are new moder-
ately well eff financially, and are generally grateful to
ABAMCC for aaking their situation as good as it is.
A more serious problem among the Shi'ites,
however, is a growing generation gap. About 75 percent of
the Shi'ites are under age 30. This group grew up with the
transaction for him, was the merchant able to cash it.
[Bef. 35:
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new affluence and largely take it for granted. They lock at
the generally pocr treatment cf Shi'ites by the Sunnis and
demand chances. It was apparently the younger generation
that sparked the November 197S and February 1980 ricts in
Catif
.
The Iraiians have made strong attempts to
agitate among the Shi'ites, taking advantage of the relative
disaffection with tie Sunni Saudi government. Sirce the
1979-60 ricts, however, the Iranian agitation and propaganda
efforts have slowed dcwn considerably. While net happy at
the treatment they receive at Saudi hands, they are net any
iiore enaaored with Khomeini.
The Saudis have recognized the possibility of
dissidence from among the Shi'ites. The potential fcr sabo-
tage ancng the cil fields and refineries is extreme. The
ever
w
reining superiority of the Saudi power in the area, and
the fact that the Shi'ites are at present unarmed, lessens
the charce cf a sericus challenge. £Eef. 37]
j. Dissident Activity
There are at present, four organized significant
dissident groups active in Saudi Arabia; Sawt al Tali'a
(Voice of the Varguard); the Saudi Arabian Communist Party;
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Nasir Sa'id's Onion cf the Peoples of the Arabian Peninsula;
and tie Islamic devolution Movement in the Aranian
Peninsula.
Sawt al Ta li* a , a newspaper, is primarily
distributed to military and student personnel outside Saudi
Arabia, ncstly in the United States. There is little cr no
activity in Saudi Arabia itself. Similarly, the Saudi
Arabian Communist Party is very small, with no evidence of
cells having been organized in the country.
The Onion of the People of the Arabian Peninsula
(UPAP) is the creation of leftist Nasir Sa'id, but has
little popular basis for support. Nasir Sa'id claimed to
have had a hand in the 197S Grand Mosque incident, tut is
generally considered to be a spurious remark calculated to
generate publicity. Sa'id disappeared in December 1979, and
his crgarizaticn has shown little activity since.
The only group with any sort of popular base is
the Shi'a Islamic revolution Movement in the Arabian
Peninsula. It is nest likely supported by Tehran as the
umbrella group fcr Iranian subterfuge in Saudi Arabia. They
are net considered a serious security challenge.
With the seizure cf the Grand Mosque in Mecca,
the Saudi regime found itself faced with a different fcrm of
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dissident threat. Cther than the Shi'ite based Isianic
Eevoluticr, all of the usual dissident threats aie from
leftist groups. With Juhaymar's attack, it quickly became
clear that the regime was being attacked from the Sunni
religious right. Shile tie specific movement espoused by
Juhaynan ard his followers was effectively wiped out, the
ragging fear that another religiously conservative right
wing group might gain some popular support has caused a
renewal of at least the appearance of the old Wahhabi
austerity in the Islam practiced by the royal family.
E- EEGICNAI THBEAT CCHSIDEBATIONS
Saudi Arabia is presented with a unigue set of threats
to the continued stability of its current regime. Having
traditicially been a conservative Hanbali (Sunni) Muslim
country lith a history of austere Wahhabi practices, it is
now faced with the rew problem of being outflanked en the
religious right by Islamic fundamentalists. Prime examples
are the Islamic revolution in Iran under Khomeini, the
assassination of Sadat by a conservative, fundamentalist
Sunni sect, and the Mecca Grand Mosgue incident in 1979.
Ihese, coupled with continued unrest in the Middle East,
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which has trought pressure on the Saudis to take a mere
decisive rele, places them in an uncomfortable positicr.
1 . Isl ami c Fund amental ism
Although it is generally agreed that the Islanic
revcluticn in Iran under Khomeini is not exportable, it does
pose seme serious problems for the Saudi government. There
are existing in Saudi Arabia numerous conservative religious
groups, espousirg an austere fiahhabi approach to Islam not
altogether different from that practiced at the turn cf the
centurv ty Abdul Aziz. These groups argue that the Al-Sa'ud
have strayed from the true path of Islam and shculd no
longer enjoy the privilege cf being the guardians cf the
Holy Cities. Claims by Ayatollah Khomeini to this effect,
while Ect ir and of themselves taken seriously, cause others
to take up the idea, thereby pesing a threat to the 5audi
regime. The fact that an Islamic revolution could succeed
against a U.S. backed monarch}' in Iran is an inspiration to
hopefuls in other countries. Shile a Shia revolution would
not be likely to occur, a serious attempt by conservative
Sunni elements might gain seme popular support in 5audi
Arabia.
£5
Certain activities by the Al-Sa'ud lend themselves
to attack from conservative quarters. The expensive and
"high rcllixg" actions of the princes cf the royal family,
particularly while overseas in Europe and the United States,
bring easily founded charges cf non-Islamic practices. King
fahd's building of numerous expensive palaces across Saudi
Arabia, often at the expense of tearing down local villag-
ers 1 dwellings, are net calculated to bring about popular
good Kill en the part of the Saudi citizenry. [Bef. 38]
Such actions allcw ctarges to be seen as legitimate it the
eyes cf the populatici, providing a good medium for creating
an an ti-ioyaiist sentiment.
Eecently, the Iranians have been active in pclitical
and religious demonstrations while participating in the
annual Hajj to Mecca and Medina. These protests, while
always in the form of being legitimate calls tc proper
Islamic practices are actually attacks on the legitimacy of
the Saudi regime. lie Saudi gcvernment is then placed in an
extremely difficult tositicn in relation to handling the
situation.
Should the demonstrations be allowed to continue,
they risk a widening cf support for such action, which ulti-
mately could lead tc the downfall of the royal family.
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Clamping dcwn, on tie other hand, places them in the posi-
tion cf being an easy target for charges that the Saudi
regime is denying inrccent pilgrims their right and ctliga-
tion tc participate ir the Hajj. The dilemma poses serious
problems for the future. 26
That the Saudi government has felt an attack from
the Islanic right is demonstrated by recent actions on the
part cf the regime. Over the past five years varying
amounts cf energy were expended by the King and other senior
princes in forcing tie royal family princes to he in Saudi
Araiia during the morth of Ramadhan, and to participate in
the reguired ceremonies and fasting. The previous practice,
and still gcing en tc some extent, was for many to leav* the
country tc avoid the necessary sacrifices. Other restric-
tions have been placed on the local population and
foreigners, all rased on traditional Islamic practices, tut
2e The Saudi Arabian government ran a paid political
advertisement in the Pakistan Times on 8 September 19S3.
The Saudi Sinister cf the Interior issued a statement and
announced several actions which would be taken to curt the
political activities cf Iranians while on the Hajj. Ihe
article warned that Iranian charges were propaganda, and
that Saudi Arabia wculd take harsh action if necessary.
"The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia will not be lenient or telerant
in taking preventive actions against anyone who tries to
rreach law and order or practises acts other than the
Islamic principles, in order to maintain normalcy ard to
discharge the duty assigned tc it."
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apparently are widely regarded as superficial ard trans-
parent neves which are mere annoying than substantial.
£Ref. 3S;
Ihe Mecca Grand Mosgue incident of 1979 posed a
serious threat to the Saudis, as their anility to adequately
defend tie Holy cf Hclies was challenged directly. Only by
recapturing the Mosque and publicly executing the rebels in
a relatively short tine span, were the Saudis able to stave
eff serious negative opinion in the rest of the Islamic
world. It is interesting to note that the leader cf the
rebellious group which captured the Mosgue was an Gtaiha, a
tribe which was the backbone of the ultra conservative
Kahhati based Ikhwar movement of the 1920's. Ihe main
tattle cry cf the rebels in the Mosgue was that the Al-Sa'ud
vere ret true Muslims, not worthy of being the protectcrs of
the Mcsgue, and called for a return to true Islamic govern-
ment, fchile many had been locking for an assault from the
political left, the actual attack was from the right.
£cme attention has been placed on the potential
threat from the local Shi'ite minority within Saudi Arabia.
Uith the 1S79 revolution in Iran and the incident at the
Mecca Grand Mosgue in December of that year, came nearly
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concurrently a series of protests and riots within the Ehi'a
areas ci eastern Arabia. This caused concern in seme cuar-
ters, and at the tine all the events were linked. The
United States made statements to the effect that Iran ^as
behind the Mosque incident. It is apparent now that this
was net the case, and the Saudis most likely never consid-
ered it as a serious jcssibili ty
.
lie Shi'a have always been treated ^uite pecrly by
the Saudis. The attitude dates to the teachings cf ibn
wahhai and his strong prohibitions against the veneraticn cf
shrines, a practice cemmon in Shi'a Islam [fief- 40]. Ihe
methods used to put cewn the 1979-80 riots and the actiens
taken against them en the Hajj have probably shown the local
Shi'a that there is little to gain by continuing large scale
protests, [fief. 41]
2- Eeq ional Arab Unrest and the Search for Consensus
It is apparent from the current activity cf the
Saudis that a near desperate search is being conducted for
some scrt of agreement among the Arab countries. In a style
wnolly atypical cf previous actions, Saudi Arabia nas taken
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a forceful lead. Without the order of a consensus, Saudi
Arabia is clearly uncc nf ortable in the situation with vhich
it firds itself surr cunded. 27
Ncne ol the three traditional centers of Aran civi-
lization, Cairo, Danascus, or Baghdad, are able tc take a
forceful lead politically in the Middle East. Cairc, still
under the cloud of the Camp David agreement (in Aran eyes)
is clearly cut of the picture. Baghdad, involved ix a lcng
term attrition war with Iran, has all of its attention
facing east. Assad in Damascus, despite his desires to be
the new Nasser, has his hands full with the Israelis, the
Palestinians, and Leranon.
fiith unrest surrounding it, and the lack of a clear
leader or spokesman, Saudi Arabia has unchar acteris ticly
stepped intc a leadership rcle. Faced on the one hand with
a close relationship with the United States, and en the
ether with a public stance m support of the Palestinians
27 Ihe term "search fcr consensus" and much cf the
material in this section is taken from a lecture given by
Er. fialcclm Peck at the Naval Postgraduate School, Mcnterey,
Calif crria, on 4 November 1 S 83 # and from interviews with him
conducted by the author at the Middle East Institute,
Washington, D-C. ce 16 November 1983 and at his heme in
Arlington, Virginia en 6 March 1984.
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against Israel, its position becomes all the more confusing
and precarious.
Kith the general unrest among the Arab nations comes
a call iica those Aral countries for Saudi Arabia, with all
its great wealth, tc provide finances to the front line
states. Ihese countries, seeing the United States as the
primary supporter of Israel, bring pressure on the Saudis to
change tie nature of their relationship with the Americans.
Ihis conflict of interest has clearly been cause for
great ccicern among the Saudi leadership. On one hand, the
Saudis see a need tc stand by and support their Arab
brothers, while the United States is viewed as a necessary
trump card to have standing by for defense. American pclicy
toward Saudi Arabia cften does not take this quandary into
account. Ihe method of handling decisions on arms sales,
agreements on defense arrangements, as well as business
deals cften embarrass the Saudis publicly to their, and
ultimately, the United States' detriment.
Ihe pressure en the Saudis to renounce the special
relationship with the United States is significant, tut has
been kept under conticl by certain political actions on the
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part cf tie Saudis. The 1973 cil embargo, while ultimately
having little effect en the United States, did brine a large
political tenefit tc Saudi Arabia with the ether Arab
states. 28 Cther moves to counter charges of being a lackey
cf the Crited States involve financial support fcr Yasir
Arafat and his Palestine Liberation Organization. Active
involvement in cease lire negotiations in Lebanon have also
troucit forth satisiactory results in relations with Arab
neighrcrs.
In cther areas, strcng financial and moral support
for Iiag against Iran has yielded benefits. Military ship-
ments tc Iraq have been allcwed to cross Saudi Arabian
territory. While ulterior motives have been cited fcr Saudi
support fcr Irag, the fact that it is actively doing so is
to Saudi Arabia's credit in Arab eyes. Rhile support has
2e It appears that iruch cf the panic by oil companies and
the Anerican public at the time of the oil emtargo was
psychological. Less than 15 percent of imported cil came
from Saudi Arabia at that time, and even less is imported
today. The embargo was perhaps a blessing in disguise by
actually forcing a move for conservation and stockpiling cf
petrcleua for future crises. As of 1 November 1963,
Department cf Energj estimates placed O.S. stockpiles as
teinc able to last almost three years at present usage
rates. Ihis estimate will prcbably remain good as the
United States has the same level of energy consumpticn in
1983 as it did in 1973, the result of an active conservation
and efficiency program.
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teen less tangible, Saudi cutcries against the Soviet inva-
sion cf Afghanistan in support of the Afghan mujahidin was
partially a political necessity to maintain Islamic legiti-
nacy in the regicn.
Until some scrt of consensus is reached amcrc the
Arab states, 29 Saudi Arabia will continue to feel threat*
ened. lie history cf Middle Eastern politics is full of
incidents where geceral unrest has resulted in the
destabilization and downfall of the strongest cf gcvern-
nents. A unified sense of direction among Arab states,
while far short cf the Arab Nation desired by some, wculd go
a long way toward reassuring the Saudis of their security.
C. SA0D1 ABABIA ANE THE GULF STATES
1 . Ihe Gulf Cooperation Council
Saudi Arabia sees itself as a natural leader ir the
Arafian Gulf region. In crder to realize the leadership
role, a proper vehicle must be maintained. Since reing
29 Ihe "search for consensus" is largely limited tc the
Arab part of the Middle East. While a consensus including
the ncn-Arat Muslims, particularly the Iranians, as well as
the Pakistanis, would te better, a simple Aral agreeiert and
a forn of unity in cause wculd he sufficient to allay many
Saudi fears.
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organized in 198 1, the Gulf Cooperation Council has premised
to be just that vehicle, giving Saudi Arabia the means to
voice its cjinicn and exercise its influence.
Despite longstanding desires by Saudi Arabia arc the
smaller Gulf States to form an economic cooperative group,
little action had been made in that direction prior to 1980.
None cf these ccuntiies wanted to form a Gulf Cooperation
Council if it meant that Iran or Irag was going tc be a
member. Iran and Irag were too powerful, economicly and
more importantly, militarily. Any Gulf organizaticn which
included either or bcth of the two largest nations in the
regicn wculd be completely dominated by those countries. No
serious noves were made until Iran and Irag could be effec-
tively tarred frcm menbership.
With the 197S revolution in Iran, that country was
removed frcm the eguation. The Sunni Muslim Gulf ccuntries
had nc desire tc participate with a radically fundamental
Shi'ite Muslim regime. Khomeini was also clear in his
proncuncements ttat ie would net cooperate, either.
Ihe following year, Irag approached Saudi Arabia and
the ether Arab Gulf States with a plan to regain Khuzistan,
a regicn cf primarily ethnic Arabs along the Iranian Persian
m
Gulf coast. Saudi Araria, seeing an opportunity tc strike
at an apparent threat to their legitimacy and regional
stability, endorsed Iraq's plan, promising finatcial
support . 30
Immediately recognized by Saudi Arabia and the ether
Arab Gulf States, was that Irag's involvement in a war with
Iran effectively removed that country from participation as
a Gulf flayer. Because of Iranian attacks along the short
25 mile Iragi coastline/ Irag was soon unable to ship oil by
the Persian Gulf route. Irag ceased to be a Gulf nation.
Kithin months of the opening of conflict between
Iran and Irag, Saudi Arabia guickly organized the remaining
Gulf States, and the Gulf Cooperation Council was formally
announced. Considering the size of Kuwait, Eahrain, Qatar,
the United Arab Imirates, and Oman, there was little doubt
that Saudi Arabia with its larger population, geographical
3C Khuzistan has traditionally been part of Persia,
although the people are ethnicly Arab and speak Arab. When
Irag irade plans to invade the region there was widespread
opinion that the Khuzistanis would welcome the Aran Irakis
with cpen arms as liberators from Persian tyranny. The
Iragis and the rest cf the Arab world were taken aback when
they found that the KhuzistaDis felt themselves tc be
Iranian and did not rise up against the Khomeini regime.
Nationalism, in the Western sense, had seemingly taken
priority ever Pan-Arar ethnic ties.
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area, cil reserves aid economic base, would te the dominant
member, "first among equals."
2- Gulf Commonalties
An examinaticr as to why six Aran countries would
want to fcrai a cooperative organization reveals several
likely reasons:
1. Siiilar forms cf government. All are monarchies
rased on the traditional desert patriarchal systems
cf the type ccmmon to the Middle East for centuries.
2. Moderate/conservative views of government. While a
spectrum cf pclitical views can be observed within
the GCC, Kuwait being seen as further to the left and
Cman to the right, all are basicly conservative or
moderate in their views of regional and in ternatioral
politics.
3. Siailar econoiic bases. All, except Oman, are cil
rich and rely heavily en the West to purchase their
product. The West in turn supplies them with needed
materials, technologies and manpower training.
4. Eeligious and ethnic ties. All of the governments
are Sunni Muslim and ethnicly Arab. (Khile the popu-
lation on Bahrain is primarily Shi'a, the governing
elite are Sunri.)
5. Mutual threat. All, to some extent, see Iran as a
mutual threat to their local governmental stability
and legitimacy. Irag is seen as a lesser, though
very real dancer, as is the Soviet Union. The threat
of the Soviet Union is not so much military as the
possibility cf bringing about dissention and internal
unrest.
6. Geography. All are ccntiguous to the Persian Gulf
and rely to seme extent on unimpeded access through
the Straits of fiormuz fcr economic well being.
7e
Ihere is a basic feeling among tne countries cf the
Gulf Cooperation Council that despite enmities, they need
each ether. 3eing sinilar in political outlook, instability
in the region is cause for concern. Instability can spread,
possibl) threatening the legitimacy of the local government
bringing about the downfall of the regimes. A coup or revo-
lution in one of the countries is cause for concern to all.
fihile each cf the Gulf states had its own reasons
for joining into the GCC , the military threat cf the
Iran-Irag war, along with the attempted coup in Eahrain,
provided the catalyst for action. While mutual nilitary
defense has come fron the union, a primary concern was the
lainterarce of a stable financial and economic base as veil.
It was evident to the Gulf countries that any possibility
for development, progress and security was tied uc in the
tremendous wealth bicught about by the oil. An economic
union would create assurances that the wealth cculc be
protected, ensuring their futures.
In November 1S83, the GCC conducted its first joint
military maneuvers. Rhile independent reviews are mixed as
to the real success and significance of the exercise, the
Gulf States themselves are apparently serious. There is a
reali2ation that Irar and Iraq could possibly be a real
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military threat, ard that no one of the GCC countries by
itself cculd stand up to such an attack.
Ihe single strongest trump card held by the GCC is
the inplied cooperation of the United States. Eccionic
cooperation has beer openly ongoing since the 1930s.
military cooperation is less open, but still present, espe-
cially ir Eahrair and Oman. Even the AWACS unit in Saudi
Araria, while nominally Saudi, is primarily manned and oper-
ated by C.S. personnel. The three to five ship Middle East
force is lased in Eahrain, and Oman routinely allows
American units to use its air bases, particularly Masirah
Island, for support and resupply. The Soviets have no
similar access into the region.
-• Gulf Strategy
lie strategy cf Saudi Arabia and the ether GCC
nembers can be summarized as consisting of three sajor
points, lased largely on the common interests cited above.
1. Maintain anc strengthen conservative political
sjs terns.
2. Discourage radical incursions, either right wing
fundamentalist (Iran) or left wing revcluticnary
(EEEX).
3. Keep the superpower rivalry out of the Gulf.
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As discussed above, all of the GCC countries have an
interest in encouraging the maintenance and continued
strengthening of governments which have similar conservative
values. Close at hand with this is the simultaneous
discouragement of radical incursions into the region. Any
significant departure from the moderate views of the Gulf
countries poses a danger to stability by potentially chal-
lenging authority ard legitimacy. Iran and the Eecples
Lemccratic Republic of Yemen are the two most serious
incursions currently causing concern to Saudi Aratia and
the ether Gulf States. Much of their political and diplo-
matic effort is expended in attempting to lessen the impact
cf Iran and the EDHY.^x
The third point, keeping the U.S. -Soviet rivalry cut
cf the Gulf, ranks guite high in priority. A Soviet pres-























ssions with the Saudi Arabian desk officers at
tate Department and at the Defense Intelligerce
al that much more re the way of security cculd he
e Aran states if they were really serious afceut
cutside agitation. One instance was noted where
of Iranian agents were intercepted as they got
at on a Kuwaiti reach in broad daylight. Despite
ess of the Iranian agents, and the excellent
conditions, it was only by the accident of a
eman traveling ty that they were discovered and
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from left-wing organizations. At present there is cc strong
Communist or Marxist organization active in the Gulf coun-
tries, and the perception among most officials is that the
GCC members will see to it that it remains that way.
A presence tv the United States is not seen as a
danger in and of itself, but rather as a provocation for the
Soviets to recome involved. Even though there is a recog-
nized eccnonic relationship with the United States, as well
as United military cooperation, the Arabs prefer to Keep
the Americans at arm's reach. Too close a relationship with
the United States will risk involving the Soviets.
Saudi Arabian Gulf Strategy can be seen as a plan to
maintain a "status guo" among the conservative, desert
patriarchal countries. Any situation which keeps a
consensus from being formed among the Arab countries is
cause fcr ccncern. The most secure system is one which is
closest to the traditional Arat tribal method of maiitaining
crder by general consensus, rather than by outright force.
£• BEGICMAI SECUBITI EBCBLEHS
A discussion cf the threats to Saudi Arabian security
depends a great deal on who is doing the discussing. Ihe
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royalists will see ore set cf problems, while anti-rcyalists
will see another. Ihe problem can be viewed from a Saudi
point cf view or frcm that ex the United States and the
Best. Ihis chapter will attempt to take the divergent views
into consideration ard determine an evaluation of the chal-
lenges to the security of the country as it is seen from
withir Saudi Arabia. Iran, Iraq, Israel and the general
atmosphere cf unrest in the fiiddle East will be examired
individually.
1- Isr ael # Egypt, and the Palestinian s
In almost anv discussion about the political prob-
lems in the Middle last, the question of the Arab-Israeli
dispute is bound to arise. There are those who will unegui-
vocally state that should the Israelis be removed from the
area, all the unrest among the Arab and Islamic states would
be eliminated. This position is a more radical one,
however, the more commonly held feeling being that Israel
has new become a fact cf life.
Ihe issue of the creation of Israel was a matter of
some importance to King Abdul Aziz during the 1930's and
<40's. Cespite Quraric teachings that they are people "of
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the heck," 32 it is c,uite clear that he was not friendly
toward tie Jews- Ccl. Harold Dickson, then the Eiitish
agent in Eahrain, gave an acccunt of one very strong state-
lent made by the King in 1937.
Our hatred for the Jews dates from God's condemnation of
then fcr their persecution and rejection of 'Isa (Jesus
Christ) and their subsequent rejection later of His
chosen Prcphet (Muhammad)-...
He went en tc vocalize his feelings later that year
when, in angry respense to Britain's 1937 Peel Report, the
plan to partition Palestine into separate Arab and Jewish
areas, he tcld Ccl. Eickson:
Hew, C Eickson, wculd the people of Scotland like it if
the English suddenly gave their country tc the
Jews?. -.It is beyond cur understanding how ycur
Government, representing the first Christian power in
the world today, can wish tc assist and reward these
very same Jews whe mistreated your 'Isa. ...an accursed
32 The Quran states that the followers of Judaism,
Christianity, and by similar reasoning, Zoroastrianism, are
protected as having been the beneficiaries of previous,
although incomplete, revelations from God. Islam holds that
the Quran, as revealed to Muhammad, is the most recent and
final cf the holy revelations. This explains the severe
persecution that follcwers of the Bahai faith have experi-
enced ameng Islamic ccuntries, particularly Iran, as they
claim tc have received a later revelation from God than that
received by Muhammad.
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and stiff-necked race that, since the world began, has
persecuted and rejected its propnets and has always
bitter the hand or everyone who nas helped it.
[Bef. ^42 j
Abdul Aziz cculd never understand the reascning
behind the Eritish desires for creating Israel. In his 1S45
Great Eitter Lake discussions with President Frar.klir D.
Boosevelt, he exacted a promise that the United States would
rot suppcrt the creation of an independent Jewish state. 33
With Eoosevelt's death in 1945, however, also died the
promise, with Truman cuickly taking up the British pcsiticn.
Eaudi Arabia managed to keep itself out of the
ensuing conflict between the Arab world and Israel, at least
until the late 1960*5. By making public statements sympa-
thetic to the Palestinians and the Arab cause, and by
33 william A- Eddv [fief. 43] has one account of the Great
Eitter Lake conference of 1 4 February 1945- When asked by
Eoosevelt what he would suggest as the best solution tc the
Jewish Question, Abdul Aziz asked in turn who it was that
had caused the Jews the great suffering during World War II.
When tcld that it was, obviously, the Germans, he sat tack,
looked at Ecosevelt carefully, and reportedly said, "Give
them and their desceEdents the choicest lands and hemes of
the Germans who oppressed them." Abdul Aziz did not see why
the Arabs should be hcspitahle toward the Jews. "Make the
enemy and the oppressor pay," he said, "that is the way we
Arabs wace war."
providing noney tc support the so-called "frost line
states", respectability was maintained. No attempt was made
to connect oil policy, particularly in the case of the
United States, and the policy toward Israel. Political
pressure en Saudi Arabia to show oore visible participation
in the conflict v.as seen too great to resist. By 1967, a
brigade cf Saudi trccps were stationed in Jordan, ard in
April 1 S 7 3 the first earnings were sent to the United States
that future oil agreements might be in jeopardy.
Saudi Arabia's relations with Egypt are closely
involved with the Israeli question. The Saudi attitude
toward Egyptian President Nasser was, at best, cccl. In
1957, an Egyptian plct to assassinate King Sa'ud was uncov-
ered. Sa'ud decided to retaliate, putting nearly $4 million
into a project tc undercut the proposed union between Egypt
and £\ria. In March 1958, Syria exposed the plot and Saudi
Arabia was made to leck guite foolish by the resultant jrcp-
aganca campaign. Never prcver, although much evidence was
produced at the time, was a Saudi financed plan tc assassi-
nate both Syrian President Quwatli and Nasser. 34
34 Scme sources credit inspiration for the scheme tc cne
cf Sa'ud's wives, a Sjrian, who convinced him that all Syria
secretly icrged to become part of Saudi Arabia. Few sources
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After Nasser's death in 1970, relations retween
Saudi Arabia and Egypt warmed slightly, with considerable
monetary tacking of Sadat's plan to regain the lost Sinai by
ailitary action. Shen Sadat made his dramatic move of
joining in negotiaticns directly with the Israelis, the
Saudis cculd not risk their position in the Arab world.
lie Camp David accords caused a great stir cf anger
toward Egypt. Ihe primary resistance to the agreement was
en the issues of tie Palestinians and the holy places in
Jerusalen. In the eyes of the Arab world, the Camp Eavid
agreements did net gc far enough in resolving these critical
issues. Net wishing to destroy the last vestiges of a rela-
tionship with Egypt, which the Saudis have always seen as
important, Crown Prirce Fahd gave one last attempt at broad-
ening the issue.
In Karch 197S, Fahd presented his plan to Sadat and
Carter. Cnce Israel and Egypt had agreed on their cwn
settlement, a delegation of Islamic Foreign Ministers would
travel tc Washington and examine the agreement. Ihey would
for this c^inion exist, other than the fact that Sa'ud's
life's father aid uncle were used as agents between Riyadh
and Eamascus. Others point the finger at Yussuf Yassin,
then the Saudi Foreign Minister, who was angered ever the
sequestering of seme of his family's property in Syria by
the Eamascus government.
see hew it related tc the Palestinian and Jerusalei prcb-
lems. This would bicaden the peace talks, undercut left-
wing Aral hard-liners and, most important to Fahd, preserve
relations between Riyadh and Cairo. [Ref. 44]
Sadat was reportedly enthusiastic about the plan
when he kas secretly informed of it. President Carter was
not, however, ardently desiring a triumphant return to
Washington, and not wanting tc explain that a group of Arabs
would be coiring to hash out some further details. He real-
ized as hell that he would never have been able to sell the
plan to Merachim Begin. fahd was angered by the cool
response/ and on 31 fiarch 1S79, Saudi Arabia severed diplo-
matic ties with Egypt, joining the rest of the Aran world.
2. lias
Irag has been a traditional enemy of Saudi Arabia
since tre early days of Abdul Aziz's expansion. He would
lost lixely have included much of the area under his control
were it not for the direct intervention and control of the
Eritish. The placinc of the Hashemite family on the Iragi
throne by the British after fiorld War I, did nothing to
dissipate the animosities. There has been a feeling among
the Saudis that were the Iraqis not so involved in their war
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with Iran, there would be nothing stopping them from turning
their amies south. 35
Saudi Arabia would like to see Iran and Irag remain
in a stalemate situation in the present war. This would
effectively maintain a balance between the two countries,
thus keeping one free totally dominating the region. As
long as neither Iran nor Iraq can come to the forefront,
Saudi Arakia is left with the most influence. The risk of
the war escalating is certainly a concern to the Saudis, as
well as to the other Gulf States, but a continuing lew level
conflict resulting in effective neutralization is useful to
Saudi interests. 36
3S Iming an interview with Munir Khalidy, he stated "as
long as the Iracji amies are facing east, they cannot move
south." This sentinent was voiced exactly by several
government officials and academics interviewed in
Rashingtcr, D.C- November 1S83.
36During an interview with William 3. Quandt, conducted
at the Brockings Institute, Washington, D.C, on 17 Novemrer
1983, he pointed out that Prince Bandar ibn Sultan, Saudi
Ambassador to the United States, had recently made a remark
to tie effect that he was sorry "that both countries
couldn't lose the war." While not certain if the ccnment
was planned or just a slip of the tongue, it hints at the
attitude held by the Saudis.
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3. Iran
Iran, new under the rule of the Ayatcllah Khomeini,
presents a unigue threat to the Saudis. Having been unified
under the strict and austere tenants of the Wahhabisn;, Saudi
Arabia faces the prcspect of being outflanked on the right
ry a acre conservative version cf Islam. The riots in the
Eastern Province by the Shi'ite minority in late 19 7 S and
early 1 S 80 were seen as direct attacks on Saudi authority by
Khomeini. Numerous charges and contercharges have continued
to fly tack and forth across the Gulf. 37 Saudi Ar-atia has
teen cencerred with the threat of destabilization frca Iran,
as Khcireini attempts to spread his Islamic fundamentalism
across tie Gulf. Ihe conflict between the two countries
goes nuch further back than just 1979, however.
Ethnicly, Saudi Aratia is Arab while Iranians are
Persian. Ihe battles between Arabs and Persians date back
several nillennia. The Iran-Iraq war, while certairly
having ether causes, is only the latest iteration cf this
traditicral conflict.
37 See footnote 26, page 67.
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It is possitle to overemphasize the ethnic differ-
ences, as there are some cases of Iranian Arabs ar.d Iraqi
Persians net joining with the opposing side. Ihe sane is
the case in Saudi Araria with rumerous Persians, having fled
the new Iracian regime/ working openly against Khoireini from
Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states.
Ihe religious conflict strikes much closer tc hone,
however, particularly in Saudi Arabia. While both nations
are Muslin, Iran is predominately Shr'ite, with Saudi Araria
being Sunni. As tcth countries practice a particularly
conservative version cf their sect, the clash becomes very
cutspeker .
Several of tie traditional Shi'ite celebraticrs are
centered arcund histcrical events in which Sunnis clashed
with Shi'ites. Cne celebration in particular, commemorating
the death cf one of Ali's sens, can get quite emoticnal and
has brought out many harbored animosities. In Saudi Arabia,
these celerratioDS are banned or kept to a minimum. In
general, the Shi'ite population, a minority, are guite
oppressed and kett ficm most positions of importance.
Ihere are nunerous Shr*ites living in eastern Saudi
Arabia, especially around the sensitive oil fields. Ihese
Shi'ites are a major component of the AfiAHCC workforce. A
8S
threat feared by the Saudis wculd be for Khomeini to stir up
the Saudi Shi'ites in a move which would not only jeopardize
the cil fields, but the regime cf the Al-Sa'ud as well.
4
- lk£ Soviet Orion
lie Soviet Dricn is not seen by the Saudi government
as a direct military threat. 1c assume that the Saudis have
dismissed the Soviets as inconsequential, however, wculd be
to misjudge the situation- The Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan, communist agitaticn in Baluchistan, the Scviet
presence in Syria, and Marxist-Communist influence in South
Yemen (E.D.E.Y.) are all seen as a dangerous encroachment of
an anti-Islamic ideclcgy.
Ixcept for a brief period of time in the 1920's,
Saudi Arabia has not maintained diplomatic relations with
the Scviet Onion. Tie reasons behind this decision prctatly
fall intc two bread categories.
Ideological differe nces- Saudi Arabia likes tc see
itself and have others see it as the center of the Islamic
world. The Al-Sa'ud in turn want to encourage the percep-
tion that they are tie protectors of the faith and guardians
cf the hcly places. There is most likely a fear that by
opening formal relations with the Soviets, the religicus
legitimacy cf the Al-Sa'ud may be damaged.
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Pragmatic security- Opening formal diplomatic rela-
tions with the Soviet Union would require the placing of a
Soviet Embassy in Riyadh or Jeddah. The presence or what
would prctaily re ar excep ticnally large embassy staff is
sometting which may cause seme Saudi discomfort. Ihe
Kuwaiti experience of large scale recruiting of students by
Soviets for education in the Soviet Union is something the
Saudis want to avoid £Bef. 45].
Ihe lack of formal diplomatic relations dees not
imply that there is re contact between Saudi Arabia and the
C.S.S.F. Crown Prince Atdullah has maintained periodic
contact kith the Soviets and Foreign Minister Prince Sa'ud
al-Faisal travels tc Moscow frequently. Periodicly there
are unofficial statements, usually leaking through the
Kuwaiti press, that the Saudis are considering opening
formal relations with the Soviets. Tnese statements appear
to be mostly aimed at influencing the United States to stand
closer tc the Saudis rather than any real intention to allow
an embassy cr consul in Riyadh. For the present, however,
Saudi Arabia seeiis tc have the best of arrangements from its
cwn pcint of view. The Saudis have contact with Moscow
whenever they want it withcut having to endure any of the
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disccufcrts of a Soviet embassy and the resultant emtassy
diplcnats and KGE agents.
The Saudi ccrcern with the Soviets is very real
despite the apparent gamesmanship being exercised. There
«as a sticng anti-Soviet respcrse from the Saudi government
following the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan. The Saudis
openly encourage private contributions by individuals tc the
cause of the mujahidic fighters in Afgnanistan. Saudi offi-
cials have confirmed privately that government money as well
is being spent ic support of the anti-Soviet aujahidin.
The fighting en the border of South Yemen has been
going en for some time. Clashes as recent as January 1 S 84
have kept concern high over the issue of the undefined
border. The Soviet supported Marxist regime in Aden is
viewed by the Saudis as being un-Islamic and potentially
dangerous tc the stability of the peninsula. While conflict
ever the herder has teen going on since the days of Abdul
Aziz's attempts to incorporate the Yemens into his kingdem,
the ccrcern todaj appears tc be tne ideological damace *hich
Harxisa/CcmEunisni could cause to the stability of a conser-
vative, capitalist criented, Muslim regime.
III. DEALING WITH TEE UNIT ED STATES: AN EMEASEAJ5SING AII1
King Abdul Aziz got an early indication of what the
United States would he like tc deal with in 1945. He had
met with President Roosevelt on 14 February 1945 at the
Great Eitter Lake Corference. After a friendly and highly
publicized £Eef. 46] meeting during which it became apparent
that the men were impressed with each other, Roosevelt prem-
ised atdul Aziz that the United States would not change its
opposition to the fcrmation cf a Jewish state in Palestine
without first consulting the Arabs [Ref. 47]. On 5 April
1945, tie President formally confirmed his promises in a
letter tc Abdul Aziz, stressing that tne statements were not
just personal, but "in my capacity as Chief of the Executive
Eranch of this Gcverment. " £Bef. 48] President Rcosevelt
died cne week later.
In less than six ironths , President Harry Truman held a
meeting cf the U.S. Chiefs cf Mission to Saudi Arabia and
the otter ccuntries ccrcerned with the Palestine issue. It
tecame apparent that although he would listen to the various
arguments presented, his mind was made up to support the
creation of a Jewish state in Palestine.
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"I'm sciry, gentlemen/" he said, "nut I nave tc aiswer
to hundreds of thousaids whc are anxious for the success of
Zionism; I do net have hundreds of thousands of Arars among
my constituents." £ Eef . 49]
Thus, within a space of six months, U.S. policy toward a
major Middle East issue had teen completely reversed.
Something of a pattern for U.S. -Saudi relations had regun.
A. A CLASE OF CULTOEJS
fluch of the difficulty involved in discussions tetveen
Saudi Arabia and the Cnited States lies in the difference of
cultures and political systems. While nearly all political
and diplomatic decisions are aired publicly in the United
States, the same is ret true in Saudi Arabia. Dealing with
the Aaericar propensity for public debate is a major concern
in Arar cuarters.
lie £audi political system and the Al-Sa*ud royal family
are essextially one ard the same. To discuss Saudi politics
is to discuss the faaily. In Arab society, family affairs
are a very private matter. Thus, when Congress and the
American press criticize Saudi actions, they are criticizing
the Al-Sa'ud, invading what is a last bastion of privacy.
[Bef. 50:
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Sealing with the United States is troublesome ici the
Saudis. Gre Saudi official used the term "nassle" en mere
than cne occasion during an interview with the author. Ihe
inciderts most commcnly rrought up when discussing the
difficulties of dealing with the United States are the F-15
and AKACS deals. Cnce it became known that consideration
was being given to selling the equipment to the Saudis, the
American press and Ccngress launched into a great debate
ever the relative merits of such a sale. The Saudis, while
aware that this is typical of U.S. politics, are embar-
rassed by the prccedtre and beccme uncomfortable when faced
kith it.
This aversion to public embarrassment carries over into
private business practices. Saudi businessmen are very
sensitive tcward being re-fused, especially if the refusal is
based en their being Arab. Cne California businessman indi-
cated that when he is making inquiries for Saudi clients, ne
is usually instructed to back cut quickly and quietly should
objecticis to dealing with Arars be encountered. [Kef. 51]
The Arat method cf doing business is often described by
Kestemeis as unethical. Ibis usually indicates a lack of
understanding on the part of the Westerner just as tc what
ethic is at wcrk. The Arab business ethic must be
understood ty anyone having associations with Saudis. This
dynamic pervades not cnly private dealings, nut extends into
governmental arrangements as well. Shaw and Long [let. 52]
lay cut four common denominators which cover both private
and public transacticis.
1. All business transactions are highly personalized.
This was confirmed in discussions with American fcusi-
nessmen. Personal trust and a man's word being his
tend are very nuch the rules of the game. A persoral
contact is ccrsidered a valuable asset. Officials
will go out of their way to cultivate personal rela-
tionships. It is also not considered unethical to
extend a favor to a friend.
2. The party most desiring the transaction is at the
greatest disadvantage. This is often a psychological
game. It is ret uncommon for one individual to make
another wait ^ust to show them that he is not too
eager.
3. One should charge what the market will bear and let
the buyer beware. It is the responsibility of the
purchaser to know teforehand what the fair market
value of a product is and then insist on this price.
Americans are often at a disadvantage when operating
in this type of atmosphere.
4. Pay only for services rendered or goods received.
Acain, the responsibility is placed on the buyer.
Ihere is no prohitition on the seller against
attempting to charge for goods not delivered. Honey
changing hands for favors or services which in the
United States might te considered a conflict of
interest or even bribery are loosely covered by the
Arabic term "taksheesh", a gratuity or tip.
This business ethic is rot just common to the Middle
East. Anyone who has been to the street markets in Mexico
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cr the Client will recognize the pattern immediatly.
Americans who charge the Saudis with unethical tusiness
practices are often irerely the victims of unwise acticrs on
their cwx cart, showing a lack of understanding, or as Shaw
and long phrase it, "an attempt by Westerners tc iiipcse
fcestern standards in a kind of ethical imperialism "
[fief. 53]
E. TEE 1SBAEII/ZI0N1ST LOBEX
If the United States continues to pursue this pro-Israel
policy, contradictions will persist in the Middle East.
[fief. 54]
Prince Sa'ud al-raisal
Saudi Arabia, while it claims a position of close coop-
eration with the United States, has always been troutled by
the Aoericac ties tc Israel. Israel is seen as a primary
source of trouble in the Middle East. Its injecticc irto
the regicD in 1948 is perceived as having brought about
unrest and turmoil. The U.S. support, now formalized ty a
strategic ccoperatior agreement, causes Arab countries to
telieve that regardless of what policy Israel may take, the
United States will blindly support it.
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Criticism that the United States government is urduly
influ€Eced ty pro-Israeli lobbies is increasing. A rumter
cf individuals, including a few members of Congress, have
teen cutspcken. Fcrmer Senator James Ahourezk, Serator
Charles Mathias, Jr., former Congressman Paul "Eete"
McClcsky, and former Congressman Paul Findlay are most
rotatle in recent months. All of the above listed mer are
tranded ty the Israeli lobby as being anti-semitic for their
comment s.
Atcurezk claims, from his cwn experience in Congress,
that "the Israeli lorry has teccme so professional that tiey
virtually dcminate the Middle East foreign policy decision
makirg in both Congress and the Administration." £Bef. 55]
Ibis domination appears to be based in the ability cf the
lobby to support friends and defeat enemies with financial
contributions. Abourezk continues, "If a member of Congress
refuses to go along with a request, the Israeli lobby
threatens him with defeat." £Eef. 56 J
fcten the bill tc authorize the sale of the AHACS
aircraft caie before Congress, the Israeli lobby tcck an
immediate stand against it. Initially, it appeared that the
bill would fail. Tactics such as distributing com jlimertary
copies cf the novel Eoloca ust to every member of Congress
S8
during the AWACS debate were used. Ihe connection has teen
cpenly made between any support for Arab states and anti-
semitism. Although a recent memorandum from AIPAC (American
Israel lublic Affairs Committee) [fief- 57] has advised
against this tactic, Senator Charles Matthias, a suppcrter
cf selling the AWACS to Saudi Arabia, was attacked in a
Jewish newspaper in New York as valuing "the importance of
cil ever the well-being of Jews and the State of Israel."
[Bef. 58] Ccngressmar Pete McClosky had very much the same
experience in 1980.
When I ran for reelection in 1980, I was asked a gues-
ticr atcut peace ir the Middle East, and I said if we
were ccing to have peace in the Middle East we memters
of Congress were gcing to have to stand up to our Jewish
constitueits and respectfully disagree with them on
Israel. Well, tre next day the Anti-defamation league
of I*nai B'rith accused me of fomenting anti-semitism,
saying that my remarks were patently anti-semitic
.
[Bef. 59]
Recognizing the strength cf Israeli lobbies in Ccngress,
the Saudis mounted a carefully planned campaign to hin
support for the AWACS bill. Ihe U.S. national interest
tecame tie arguing pcint, and business and industrial inter-
ests were recruited to support the deal for financial
reasons. Knowing that the Senators and Congressmen were
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under extreme piesstre from Zionist organizations not to
support the bill, the Saudi lobbying effort was also
intense. Supported by President Reagan, again arguing using
strong rational defense reasons, the bill was finally
approved
.
She amount of effort reguired to get the AWACS bill
through Congress reinforced the Saudi view that prc-Israel
groups dominate and are overly influential in the U.S.
government. A senicr Saudi diplomat told the author that
the United States was allowing Israel to control it rather
than the United States having any real control ever Israel.
Ihis private remark is backed up oy public statements from
many cf the Arab states, not only Saudi Arabia.
While the Saudis have complained about the influence of
the Israeli lobby, there is increasing action to raise the
effectiveness of pro-Arab lobbies. In the past five years
the Saudis have educated themselves on the intricacies and
realities of American politics. That the F-15 and AHACS
sales were approved despite strong pro-Israeli Ichtying
efforts shevs hew much the Saudis have progressed. That
there is still a lcrg way to go is demonstrated by the
recent failure of the bill to allow the sale of stincer
Anti-aircraft missiles to Saudi Arabia and Jordan.
1CC
C. A CCBCEIH FOB NIIBSTAN LIN
G
Luring the research for this thesis, the author bad the
cccasicn to interview ruierous Arabs, including officials of
the Saudi Arabian gcvernmert. In all these cases, the
course of the conversation was similar. All started cff
with a lengthy discussion cf bhy Saudi Arabia is impcrtant
to the United States. This was followed ty observaticns
about tie C.S. relationship with Israel. After a few
general ccmaents abcut security in the Arabian Gulf, all
then ended with a plea for a tetter understanding cf the
Arab, and in particular the Saudi, point of view.
Ibis pattern, while not otvious at first, is revealing
cf the ccncerns in Saudi quarters. It is apparent that the
Saudis are convinced, for whatever reason, that U.S. suppcrt
and aid is important, if not vital. It is also apparent
that Israel worries them. With the final item, thcugh,
seemingly lies the key to all the Saudi ccncerns. If the
American decision-iakers (Administration, Ccngress,
military) can be educated intc a better understanding cf how
the Saudis view Middle Eastern dynamics, the security of
Saudi Arabia will be tetter assured.
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In all of the ccnversaticns it was evident that the
Saudis were desirous of a different sort of relationship
tetweer themselves and the United States than existed
letween the U.S. and the Shah's government in Iran refcre
1979. Here is a seise that if a deeper understandirg could
exist retween the the countries, the shallowness of the
Iranian relationship could te avoided. Understanding would
also allcw the United States to conduct its business with
Saudi Arabia without causing undue embarrassment . If botn
Americans and Saudis kill take General Kingston's 38 words to
heart, perhaps a tetter mutual "understanding of cultural
sensitivities" will take place. A combined effort toward
under starding each other can he seen to be in the interests
of both the United States and Saudi Arabia.
3fi See guote on page 11.
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IV. HALING Hllfl THE SAODIS
lie United States has a difficult time dealing with the
Saudis. Anthony Ccrdesman £Eef. 60] wrote, "American
national security plainers never have an easy time dealing
vith the Middle East." In many ways these difficulties are
the mirrcr images of the difticulties the Saudis have with
the United States. Americans, grounded in such truisis as
"all nen are created e^ual" and "government by the pecpie,
for the pecjle, and of the people," have a difficult time
accepting that a fanily rule monarchy can be ail cccd.
Similarly, en religicus grounds, Christians, to say nothing
cf the Jews, hold deeply grounded fears and prejudices
against what are perceived as anti-Christian Muslims. Ihe
1973 Cil Emrargo and the later rejection of the Caup Eavid
peace accords have dene nothing to make relations easier.
In sfite of all the above, the United States has chosen
to work Kith Saudi Arabia as a special friend in the Middle
East. Cil is at the heart cf the relationship, but with the
high levels of financial investments the Saudis have ir the
United States, the natter has shifted into other areas as
well.
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A. Ill AMEEICAN CONNECTION
lie United States has often teen credited with havinc a
"special re lati crshi j" with Saudi Arabia. The relationship
goes tack tc the 1S3C's when American prospectors disccveied
the presence of oil uider the Eamman Dome. It has grown far
beyond that, but the energy requirements of the United
States and especially Western Europe and Japan, are central.
William B. Quandt £ Eef . 61] summarizes the substance of
U.S. -Saudi relations as consisting of five parts:





lie United States has net had a coherent energy policy,
although nunerous attempts have been made to organize ere.
Demands en Saudi Aratia have, as a result, been somewhat
confusing. The list cf demands asked continued high prcduc-
tion , lew trices, security of supply, and further devel-
opment cf spare prcduction capability. The ordering of
priorities has not teen clear, although the security cf
continued supply appears tc he at or near the top cf the
list.
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Maintaining tae security cf a continued flow of cii to
the Eest is of prime concern to the United States. Should
Western lurcpe and Japan be cut off, the economic results
are lively to be disastrous, with a resultant drain or the
American economy to prop them up. There is some doufct as to
whether the Soviet Orion actually needs the oil, but it
would certainly he ir its interest to deny the West access
to it.
"he nature of securing free Western access tc the cil
has presented the United States with a dilemma. The modern-
ization cf the Saudi military is to American benefit, and
plans are underway tc do so. At the same time, the U.S. is
supporting Israel which has a great deal of influence over
what arms are sold tc the Saudis.
If naintaining regional stability is to the interest of
the United States, the maintenance in authority cf the
conservative sheikhdeas of the Gulf and the Kingdom cf £audi
Arabia is equally important. As the sheikhdoms are so small
as tc he individually ineffectual (although not uniipcr-
tant) , Saudi Arabia is the cbvious target of U.S. efforts at
maintaining regional stability. Should power ir Saudi
Arabia shift out of the hands of the Al-Sa»ud, there is a
distirct possibility that the smaller, and weaker Gulf
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States, may find it difficult tc remain in control cf th€ir
cwn situations.
Hand in hand with the cil revenue is a concurrent
econcnic and financial developmental program. While the cil
and the wealth it brings belongs to the Saudis, in order to
do anything with that wealth, some of the money must be
spent. Ihe best place to spend the money to get things that
are most beneficial tc Saudi Arabia's future develctmect is
in the Urited States.
Modern equipment for business and industry, ccimu loca-
tions and education are the lost sought after of American
goods. At the same time, to create financial security, the
Saudis have embarked on a large scale investment program,
largely in American real property and businesses. Ihe
"special relationshi t" between the United States and Saudi
Arabia, while beginning with and remaining closely related
to oil, has gone much further.
E- TEE JEAE/ISLAflIC CCHNECIICK
Your country has nc ambitions. It is only interested in
fraternity between the Arab and Islamic nations and in
sparine them the datgers posed by their enemies.
(King Fahd, 19 September 1963)
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Nc matter ho i important or special the relationship nay
te tetween the United States and Saudi Arabia, the Saudis
are first and foremost Arab and Muslim. In any conflict cf
interest tetween the United States and Arab or Islamic prin-
ciples, the Americans will take second place. lie Saudis
will dc all they can to see that the conflict of interest
does ret occur, but in a crisis, there is little doubt where
they will fall out. As evidence, note the actiens cf the
Saudis during the 19*73 cil embargo and the Camp David agree-
ment. Neither move was savored by the Saudis, whe appeared
to ha?e little choice but tc stand by the majority and avcid
possible os tracizaticr by the rest of the Arab world.
Saudi Arabia has teen in the Arab world for longer than
it has teen associated with the West. It is also directly
bordering other Arab and Islamic states. The sense cf unity
created ty Arab naticralism and Islam should not be underes-
timated. While perhaps not strong enough to create the Arab
Naticn as envisioned ty Nasser or the Ba'athists, the sense
cf urity is strong enough fcr such states to react in
defense cf cne another. 39
39 Ihe situation is often compared to that of a scuab-
bling fanily. Ihey will fight among themselves, tut should
an outsider step in and attempt to harm one of them, the
family will unite tc drive away the outsider. Cnce the
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C. CCSCIOSIONS: KEYS TO SADDI AND GULF STABILITY
A static Saudi Arabia will likely mean a statle Gulf
region, even if the Khomeini Islamic Revolution in Iran
should ccntinue. Although the various Gulf Sheikhdoms do
not like to admit it fuilicly, their stability revolves tc a
great extent around Saudi stability. The keys tc Gulf
stability, then, are the keys to stability in Saudi Arabia,
and would include:
1. Resolution or reduction in severity of the
Palestinian issue and free access to the Islamic Holy
places in Jerusalem.
2. L.S. encouragement of the Saudis in self defense
matters, particularly vis-a-vis the Iran-Iraq war.
3. Maintenance of a strong U.S. military power
projection force which can be seen by the Saudis to
te credible in defense of Saudi Aratia.
4. Creditle U.S. assurances that the Straits cf Hcrmuz
can le kept open despite Iranian intentions.
5. A U.S. tolerance of occasional Saudi political
attacks on the United States against American suppcrt
fcr Israel.
outside threat is gone, the internal squabbling will
continue. An often guoted Eedouin proverb provides seme
insight; "Me against my brother; my brother and me against
my cousin; my brother, me and my cousins against the world."
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lie Palestinian issue has teen, and will likely centime
to he a thcrn in the side of the Saudis. Forced to take up
the Palestinian issue in support of the anti-Israeli cause,
there is little doubt that the Saudis would he just as happy
if the Palestinian question would simply "go away".«o It is
clear that the Saudis will tack any settlement which is
satisfactory to the Palest irians, and will not attempt to
press the issue any further. A reduction in the severity of
the Palestinian issue, or even a feeling that tne United
States is pressing the Israelis actively for a settlement,
would gc far toward easing Saudi tensions.
Perhaps even mere important than the Palestinian issue
is the the matter cf Muslim access to the Islamic Hcly
places in Jerusalem. For Saudi Arahia to he satisfied, seme
arrangement for relatively unimpeded Muslim access to
Jerusalea must he agreed to. A recent speech ty Saudi
Eefense Minister Prince Saltan, while calling for peace in
lebancr and ceasing of the shedding of Arab blood, his
menticn cf Jerusalem seemed more important.
40 In discussions with several U.S. governmental effi-
cials and scholars involved routinely in Middle Eastern and
Saudi affairs, this view is common. While former Ambassador
to Saudi Arabia Eobert Neumann would not go so far as tc say
that, he stated, "it certainly is a problem for them, and
will likely remain sc. The problem will not go away."
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We call en the conflicting parties in Lebanon to spare
Aral fclocd, tc return to reason and consideration, and
alsc tc place the rational and pan-Arab interest arcve
any ether consideration so that we can confront the
arrcgant enemy united.- .. With good will and with the
rejection of differences, we, God willing, will te arie
to cenfrert challenges and to regain cur usurped rights,
first and foremost hcly Jerusalem, [fief. 62]
The £audis probably have nc intention, nor the manpower
means of enlarging their armed forces much beyend its
present si2e. A modernization program, however, is
certainly possible, and has teen going on for some years.
Ihe maintenance of strong suppcrt for the continued modern-
ization cf the Saudi nilitary, including the National Guard,
will alsc ease Saudi insecurity.
Crcwn Erince Abdullah has recently indicated that he is
interested in updating his artiguated National Guard, now
eguipped primarily with old armored cars, with modern U.S.
built M-1 tanks. Net widely publicized, the move was, as
expected, strongly opposed by the Jewish/Israeli lothy in
the United States. Ihe selling of H- 1 tanks (on the crder
cf 3C0) tc the Saudis, would have numerous long range
benefits to the United States, not the least of which is a
large number of first rate tanks and support equipment
effectively prepesiticned in a vital strategic area. As of
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8 March 1S84, the State Department had no position en the
natter other than to say that the M-1 tank demonstration did
not inrly an oiler cr willingness to sell to the Saudis.
The recent sale of 1CC M-60A3 tanks to the Saudis have eased
tensicrs which arose from these reports £Ref- 63].
Per the Saudis tc feel secure, there must be a credible
sense that the United States net only can, but will ccme to
its aid should scmething seriously challenge its authority.
Ihe relative lack of action and apparent helplessness en the
part cf the United States during the fall of the Shah of
Iran and the Tehran hostage crisis did little tc reassure
the Al-Sa'ud that there would be any more resolve in their
cwn case. While the Saudis dc not desire U.S. forces on
their scil, they definitely want them to be waiting "over
the herizen" to be called upon when needed.
The Saudis have actually allowed some U.S. forces on the
ground. The AWACS unit is primarily manned and operated by
U.S. personnel. There are also several military advisors in
the country on specific technical and training missiens. Cn
the natter of bases, however, the Saudis are adamantly
opposed. Quoting Ambassador Robert Neumann, "The Saudis
will never give us a base or headquarters, and we ought not
to ask fcr it." £Hef. 64] Ihe political price which the
Saudis would have to pay regionally would be too high.
111
Fcr the United States tc completely reassure Saudi
Arabia that Americans have Saudi interests in mind,
Americans must he prepared tc keep the Straits cf Hcrmuz
cpen. fihile Saudi Arabia does have pipelines across the
desert tc the Red Sea, the amount of crude which cculd be
shipped by that methcd would be limited. Even mere impor-
tant is the economic impact on the other Gulf States, which
have even more limited access to the pipelines- Should
their ability to export cil be cut off, the resultant
economic impact would have a high probability cf bringing
about the type of instability which Saudi Arabia fears most.
The increasirg number cf attacks by Iragi and Iranian
aircraft on ships operating in the Arabian Gulf raise gues-
tions as tc how the United States should react. Fcr any
acticn cf the United States to have credibility with the
Gulf states, the Saudis must be part of the decision making
process. Eecent remarks by the U.S. government indicate
that a Saudi invitation is being sought before committing
any American aircraft or ships. Reactions en the part of
the Saudis would seem to indicate that there is a strcng
reticence to utilize American naval or air power in the
region. There is mest likely a feeling that shculc the
United States become actively involved, the Soviet Union
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would net fce far behind. Ice close an overt cooperative
effort with the United States can lead to retalratici en the
fart cf Iran.
Finally, assuming that the United States will ccrtinue
to support Israel, there must he an American tolerance of
occasional Saudi political attacks. For Saudi Araiia to
maintain legitimacy in the region among its fellow Arats and
Muslims, it cannot cendone the U.S. hacking of Israel. At
the tine cf the signing of the Israel-Egyptian Camp lavid
accords, there was disappoint ment in some quarters that
Saudi Araria would not support the measures. Fcrirer
Ambassadcr to Saudi Arabia James E. Akins had a more
enlightened view of the situation.
If the current Saudi Arabian Government were in fact tc
underwrite a separate Israeli-Egyptian peace, it wculd
be overthrown hy members cf the royal family or by seme
other corste llaticn cf forces. ..It cannot do this. Cur
•experts' should know this; the Russians surely do.
[fief. 65]
Allowing the Saudis to make their comments and letting
them go unanswered will allcw the Saudis to avoid endorsing
the U.S. -Israeli alliance, yet keep lines of communication
cpen tettieen the United States and Saudi Arabia. If the
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U.S. pushes the Saudis too far, tney will ultimately with-
draw tc the protection of the Arab world, a place where it
is fai mere comfcrtarle politically than in tne West.
In light of the problem cf security for Gulf shipping,
the natter of dealing with the Saudis becomes even mere
important. Understanding how the Saudis perceive the threat
to their cwn security, and how different the perception is
from that cf the Americans, is key to an appreciation cf the
difficulty involved.
Fcllcwing discussions with U.S. State Department offi-
cials, a priorization cf the threats to Gulf stability would





A list of threats as perceived by the Saudi regime, however,
would probably lcok iike the cne below.
1 . Iran
2. Israel
3. Eadical Islamic fundamentalist groups
4. Irag
5. Scviet influence in the region
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lie second list is compiled after discussions with Saudi
officials, experts ir the region as well as the perceptions
cf State Department officers. One notices immediatly the
difference in the ratting of the Soviet Union as a perceived
threat. It is probably this perception that causes the nest
difficulty in U.S. /Saudi relations. The fact that Saudi
Crania would place Israel near the top of the list is also
difficult f cr the U.S. government to resolve.
lie choice cf whether to place Iran or Israel as the
lumber ere perceived threat is open to some debate. Saudi
official statements tlace Israel at the top, while the imme-
diate danger would appear to be Iran. There is little
doubt, however, that Israel and Iran are the top two
security ccrcerns of the Saudis.
Ire Cnited States administration likes to call attention
to the threat which is posed to the Straits of Hormuz hy the
Soviet Uricr. Hhen President Carter announced his policy
for the region after the invasion of Afghanistan, the tarcet
for his earrings was cbviously the Soviet Union. For Saudi
Arabia, however, the nainterance of an uninterrupted flew of
cil through the Straits of Eormuz is paramount in Saudi
priorities. Any closing cf or serious reduction in cil
tanker traffic through, the straits would have devastating
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effects ce the Saudi, as well as the other Gulf States'
econcoy. Recent attacks on Saudi oil tankers operatirg in
the Gulf by Iragi and Iranian aircraft have been the cause
cf great ccncern in Arab quarters. Until now there was
little actual fear that the Iranians would do anythirg to
close the Straits, as such acticn would be more dangerous to
Iranian economics thai to Irag's. A senior Saudi diplomat
was of the opinion that Iran would not be likely tc carry
cut anj such rash mcve, as to do so would "be as Sanpson
pulling the Temple dcwn on his own head." Ihe saie indi-
vidual followed that remark hy stating, ".. .but one never
knows what a crazy mar might do." The attacks on Saudi and
Kuwaiti cwned shipping outside of the war zone raise the
guesticn as to whether Iran is raising the ante in the war
to include those countries which have openly been aiding
Irag
.
Ihe U.S. response to the rising tensions in the Persian
Gulf has to date been cautious. Warning statements abcut
keeping the Gulf open to international shipping have raised
little new stir as that has teen the stated U.S. fclicy
since the declaration of the Carter Doctrine in 1980.
Irudent loves on the part of the United States Navy, such as
aovinc the flagship cf the Ccmmander, Middle East Fcrce,
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from tie Gulf to a safer pert, forestalls any chance cf an
attack ci that politically inviting target. The sale of
Stinger anti-aircraft missiles to Saudi Arabia demonstrated
that the United States can and will act decisively in spite
cf resistance by the tro-Israeli lobby. In addition, the
initial denial of the Stinger missiles to Kuwait has shewn
that there is indeed a "special relationship" with Saudi
Arabia that the cthei countries of the Gulf dc not enjoy.
There is also scire good evidence in the public record
that high level administration officials are becoming sensi-
tive to the use cf certain words and phrases. For example,
the cay after the Drited States offered the services of
United States Air Fcrce fighters in defense of shi^pirg in
the Gulf, Vice President George Bush spent most cf a five
ainute interview with NBC news stating that the United
States was not asking, had never asked, nor would ever ask
for bases in the Gulf. This shows that at least to seme
degree, the Saudi and ether Gulf states' sensitivity tc the
use cf the word "rase" in relation to the presence of
foreign forces is understood.
Cne cf the primary difficulties for the United States in
establishing a strategy for Scuthwest Asia is the attitude
cf the Arars of the Gulf tc the superpower rivalry. fchile
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there is little doubt that, in general, the United States is
favorec to the Soviet Union, Americans are not locked upon
as "trotters in arms." Keeping U.S. -Soviet rivalry cut of
the Gulf will dc much for the local Aral states iD nain-
taining their cue security.
A large U.S. presence countering any closure of the Gulf
would bring with it the risk cf provoking the Soviet Union
to mcie rash action in the region. Anything which light
give the Soviets cause to increase its activities are to be
avoided, nearly at all costs, as far as the Gulf states are
concerned.
A more serious censider ation, in the shorter term, is
the reaction which Iran will mest likely take to such a
large nilitary presence by the American "satan". Iranian
tacked terrcrist raids are already on the increase. With
any pernanent basing of U.S. forces in the area, such
attacks would no doubt increase.
The Gulf countries would be under a great deal cf pres-
sure tc condemn the Anerican presence. Those wno refused to
do so would be likely targets fcr terrorism. Even though
the Aaericar forces themselves might be relatively safe from
attack, other targets more suitable for terrorist acticn,
such as diplomats, eihassies, and the oil fields thenselves,
would be readily available.
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Eeferdiug the oil fields against the threat of a direct
terrorist attack is difficult short of physically occupying
the area with grcund troops. Best of the workers for AEAftCO
in tie cil fields cf easterc Saudi Arabia are Shi'ites.
Ihese pecple, while AFAMCO has taken care of them quite well
financially, are still the targets of strong Sunni preju-
dice, fohile there have been no violent acts in the area
since the 1S79 and 19 60 riots, the methods used by the Saudi
goverrirert to suppress the ricts have left some resertment
among the Shi'ites. Ihis poses a real threat for the possi-
bility of an Iranian tacked terrorist/sabotage campaign in
the oilfields.
Ihere is some indication that the Islamic Revolution in
the Arabian Peninsula, an Iranian backed, Shi'ite dissident
group, is somewhat active, although apparently under ccr.tiol
at present. Should a provocative act, such as a U.S. prepo-
sitioning fc troops in the area, come about, Iranian support
for the Islamic Revolution group would no doubt ircrease,
thereby raising and ret lessening, the possibility cf severe
damage tc the oil fields of Saudi Arabia.
Ihe experience cf the Arabian Gulf countries with
outside powers reinforces the view that they should be kept
nearhy, tut at an aims reach. Great Britain was useful
11S
during the nineteerth and early twentieth centuries by
providing the small sheikhdoms security from outside aggres-
sors. Interestingly, if it were not for the British pres-
ence in the Yemens, Ciian, The Trucial States (UAE) , Qatar,
Eahrain, and Kuwait, Saudi Arabia would most likely have
included them into its Kingdom during the expansion period
of the early twentieth century.
Ihere is a basic mistrust of non-Muslims which will rot
allow tie Arabs of the Gulf to admit a direct Western
defense, particularly a military presence on their owe soil.
Thus, frco the Arab point of view, the best compromise
hetween keeping the superpower rivalry out of the Gulf,
avoiding the possibility of annoying Iran too much, and yet
keeping the Western ailitary "trump card" handy if needed,
is tc keep the U.S. protection just "over the horizon."
The recent world-wide attention being riveted on the
Arabian/Ier sian Gulf region recalls a statement made bv Sir
Arnold Wilson some fifty years ago.
No arm of the sea has been, or is of greater interest
alike to the geologist and archaeologist, the historian
and geographer, the merchant, and the studert of
strategy, than the inland water known as the Persian
Gulf.
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Considering the ancunt of time being devoted to events
in the Guli regicn bj world news agencies, and the degree to
which many countries are apparently economicly dependent on
cil flowing through the Straits of Hormuz, Wilson's ccirment




If Arabic, the rame of an individual will reveal cot
cnly the particular c,iven cane, but that of his father,
perhaps his grandfather, and the clan or tribe to which he
teloncs. The term "ibn" (sometimes transliterated "tin")
means "sen cf " . Thus, Abdul £ziz ibn Abdul Rahman is Afcdul
Aziz the sen of Abdul Rahman. The feminine of ibn is "tint"
which means "daughter of".
lie ten "al" means "of". It is often used in connec-
tion with the tribe, clan or family of the individual. "Al
Sa*ud" thus means "of the Sa'ud family", or "of the House of
£a« ud."
Arcther way cf referring tc an individual is by stating
that the} are the father or nether of a particular person,
usually the oldest sen. "Abu" means "father of" and "Umm"
means "mcther of". Afcdul Aziz was often called Afcu lurJci,
the father cf Turki, his oldest son. Somen are especially
often referred to in this manner. One of the wives cf Ahcul
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Aziz, Tarfah bint Abdullah Al al-Sheikh {larfah, daughter cf
Abdullah cf the House of al-Sheixh) was also called Dram
Faisal, the mother of Faisal.
The tern "sheikh" is most commonly used as a respectiul
title, A sheikh is also a leader of a tribe, but as tribal
tedouin Arars are or the decline, the former usage is the
more usual. Thus, Muhammad ifcc Abdullah Alireza would cften
be addressed as "Sheikh Muhammad".
Numerous Arabic words are used throughout the text of
this thesis. All have been included in Appendix B alcng with
a brief trarslation cf its neariing.
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API1HDI2 B
GIC£SABY CF ABABIC TERMS
Abu. lather of.
Al al-Sheikh. The family rame of the descendents cf
Muhamnad ihn Abdul fiahhab, the founder of the fcahhabi
versicn cf Islam. £any of the Al al-Sheikh are insert an
t
religicus men today ir the various ulema of Saudi Arabia.
Al Hashii. The family which uas the enemy of the Al Sa'ud
during the early 20tt century. The Hashimites had ccctiol
ever the Hejaz, which included the Holy Cities of Mecca and
Medina. Kirg Husseir cf Jordan is the sole remaining memter
cf the fanily to still have a royal position.
Al Sa , ud. 5 he name cf the royal family or Saudi Arahia.
EaJcshecsh. A gratuity or tip. Often translated as a bribe.
Eedouin. The semi-ncnadic Arab desert dwellers. The early
pclitics cf the Aratian Eeninsula often revolved around
disputes between town dwellers and the desert bedcuiD Arab.
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Ihe £audi Arabian National Guard consists prinarily of
hedouiu.
Ein. (Often transliterated ibn) Son of.
Eint. Daughter cf.
Imir. (Amir) Commander. Often used to refer to the
governor of a town or province.
Hadith. Ite Traditions. The personal acts and sayings of
the Eroptet Muhammad.
Bajj. Ihe Pilgrimage. One cf the five pillars cf Islam.
All Muslims are expected to make at least one pilgrimage to
the Kcly City of Mecca during their lifetime if they can
afford it.
Bejaz, The western jart of the Arabian Peninsula, erccm-
cassing Mecca and Medina.
Ibn- Sen of.
Ikhwan. Ercthers or Erethren. The name used by a grcup of
fanatic Muslim warricrs employed by Abdul Aziz to secure
most cf the Arabian Eeninsula frcm 1919 to 1928.
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Imam. literally "h€ who gees before," Today the title is
used ry these whe lead the prayers in the mosque.
Insh'allah- "As God Hills."
Jihad. "Effort." Often interpreted as Holy War. It signi-
fies tie tctal effort required of a Muslim when the Paith is
reing threatened.
Koran. (Also spelled Quran) The Holy Book of Islam. The
word cf God (Allah) as revealed to Muhammad.
flahdi. The "right guided one/" who by tradition will return
to earth as an Islaiiic Messiah to establish a reign of
justice.
flajlis. Reception or sitting room. Often used to refer to
a meeting with a ruler.
Nejd. The central and eastern portion of the Arabian
feninsula around the city of Biyadh.
Cadi. A judge.
Curan. Alternative spelling of Koran.
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Eamadian. The Islanic month cf fasting and celebration cf
God's gift cf the Koran.
fhariah. Ihe Law of God. Islamic religious law.
Sheikh. Elder. Titl€ used traditionally by the leader of a
trit€« Also used tc refer to a religious leader cf the
ulema
.
01ema„ Ihe religious scholars of a community. A collection
cf men especially learned in the Koran.
Omm. Mcther of.
iadi. hccky watercourse or dry riverbed.
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4£IJNCix c
TEI SONS OP AEDO*L AZIZ
Ihe numbers in brackets indicate who the individual's full
trotheis are. Inforiation is combined from various sources.
Abdul Aziz ibn Abdul Rah nan al-Sa'ud (1876-1953) King
1902-1S52
1. lurXi (1900-1919) died 1919 Spanish flu epideaic
[2:
2. £a'ud (19C2-1969) King 1953-1964 £1]
3. Khalid (d. 1903) died in infancy




£a'ud (b. 1941) Foreign Minister
atdul Rahman {b. 1942)
Eancar (b. 1943)
lurki (b. 1945) Dir. Foreign Intelligence
5. Fahd (1904-1919) died 1919 Spanish flu epidemic
6. Muhaimad (b. 1910) renounced throne, 1965. [7]
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7. Khalid (1912-1982) King 1975-1982 [6]
Abdullah
Ear car
I a i s al
£. Sa'ad (1S14-191S) died 1919 Spanish flu epidenic
[ 1 1, 16,21,25,28,31,37]
9. Nasir (b. 1920) renounced throne, 1975
10. Sa»ad (b. 1920) renounced throne, 1975 [15,16]













12. Manscur (1922-1951) £17,19]
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13. Aidullan (b . 1923) Crcwn Prince 1982 to present and
Conmander of the National Guard
Khaiid





14. Eancar (b. 1S23) [ 2S]
15. flusa'id (b. 1S23) [ 10, 16]
16. Atdul Mohsin (t. 1925) Gov. of Medina £10,15]
Sa'ud Dep. Gcv. of Mecca
Eadr
Faleed
17. Misha'al (b. 1925) [12,19]
18. Sultan (b. 1927) Defense Minister





(b. 1928) Min. of Public Works 6 Housing
(b. 1949)
(b. 1949) Ambassador to United States




20- lalal (1930-1931) died in infancy
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21. Abdul Rahnan (r. 193 1) [6,11,18,25,28,31,37]
22- Badr (d . 1S31) died in infancy
23. lalal (b. 1931) [27 ;
24, Mishari (b . 1932)












29. Fawwaz (b . 1934) [14]
30. Majid (1934-1936) died in cnildhood
(b. 1933) [23]
(b. 1934) Interior Minister
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32. Maji<3 (b. 1S36) Gcv. of Mecca£36]
33. Ifcanir (1937-1958) [38,40]
34. Aldulillah (t. 1938) Gov. of Qassem £26,35]
35. Abdul Majeed <t. 1940) Gov. of Tabuk [26,34]
36. Sattam (b. 1940) Dep. Gov of Riyadh [32]
37. Ahmad (b. 1940) Dep- Interior flin.
[8,11,18,21,25,28,31]
38. Manduh (b. 1S41) [33,40]
39. Hidhlul (b. 1941)
40. Mashhur (b. 1942) £33,36]
4 1. Atdul Salaam (1942-1944) died in childhood
42. Mugrin (b. 1943) Gcv. of Hail
43. Hamcud (b. 1S47)
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